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ANCHORING THE LAW IN A BED OF 
PRINCIPLE: A CRITIQUE OF, AND 
PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE, CANADIAN  
AND AMERICAN HEARSAY AND 
CONFRONTATION LAW 
Mike Madden* 
Abstract: As recent case law demonstrates, both American Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and Canadian common law re-
lating to hearsay evidence are conceptually problematic. The laws are, at 
times, internally incoherent and are difficult to justify on the basis of legal 
principles. This Article critiques confrontation and hearsay law in the 
United States and Canada, respectively, by exposing the lack of principle 
underlying each body of law. The Article develops a principled basis for 
evidence law in general, and hearsay and confrontation law in particular, 
providing a more stable foundation for hearsay and confrontation frame-
works. Ultimately, the Article argues that the epistemic, truth-seeking goal 
of criminal evidence law is best served by the broad admission, rather 
than exclusion, of all hearsay evidence. Furthermore, while fairness con-
cerns are relevant to some rules of evidence, there are no valid fairness 
concerns operating in the context of hearsay and confrontation law that 
should displace the primary principle of facilitating and promoting epis-
temically accurate fact-finding in criminal trials. Finally, this Article sug-
gests that any dangers associated with the broad admission of hearsay evi-
dence can be mitigated through effective argument by counsel and 
appropriate cautions to the trier of fact regarding any weaknesses inher-
ent in the evidence. 
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Introduction 
 In many developed legal systems, the right of an accused person to 
confront witnesses against him in criminal proceedings arises out of ei-
ther the system’s constitutional jurisprudence or explicit texts of rights 
instruments.1 The right also exists within various international human 
rights treaties.2 There is, however, no universal acceptance of the content 
of one’s right to confront witnesses.3 Accordingly, throughout the world, 
the rules governing the admissibility of hearsay evidence and the cross-
examination of witnesses, the various rights to confront witnesses, and 
the broader rights of a criminal defendant to test the prosecution’s evi-
dence and to benefit from a fair trial have become so conceptually en-
tangled that it is difficult to discern a coherent unifying theory—or a 
principled basis—underlying the application frameworks for each of 
these doctrines.4 In other words, the laws relating to confrontation 
rights are an example of what Mirjan Damaška might call “evidence law 
adrift,”5 where the term “adrift” in nautical circles means a vessel that is 
neither deliberately making way through the water nor at anchor or 
made fast to the shore.6 As the laws of confrontation continue to de-
velop on an arguably ad hoc basis, it is apparent that the law is neither at 
anchor (static), nor making way (progressing in a clearly articulated di-
rection).7 The doctrinal confusion surrounding confrontation rights 
provides the backdrop to this Article and represents the key mischief 
that this Article endeavors to address. 
 In Parts I and II of the Article, I analyze the ways in which confron-
tation rights are described and protected in the United States and Can-
ada in order to ascertain whether these doctrines are internally coher-
ent, and whether they are convincingly justified on the basis of relevant 
legal principles. As the analysis in these sections will demonstrate, the 
law of confrontation in both Canada and the United States is problem-
atic for a variety of reasons—in large measure because each body of law 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Ian Dennis, The Right to Confront Witnesses: Meanings, Myths, and Human Rights, 
2010 Crim. L. Rev. 255, 255. 
2 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(e), Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“In the determination of any criminal charge against him, every-
one shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: . . . to exam-
ine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and exami-
nation of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.”). 
3 Dennis, supra note 1, at 256. 
4 See id. at 256–58, 263, 265. 
5 See generally Mirjan R. Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift 81 (1998). 
6 See The New Oxford American Dictionary 22 (2001). 
7 See Dennis, supra note 1, at 270. 
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appears to have developed without faithful adherence to unifying prin-
ciples. In Part III, I develop a theoretical basis of first principles that 
can be used to drive the evolution of evidence law, and I will suggest 
how these principles can be instructive in determining how hearsay 
evidence should be treated within a criminal trial. My goal in Part III is 
to propose a theoretically defensible and internally coherent frame-
work for the application of evidence law to the “confrontation” rights of 
an accused person facing criminal charges in any developed legal sys-
tem. Ultimately, I conclude that neither American nor Canadian law 
protects confrontation rights in theoretically defensible and internally 
coherent ways; thus, careful rethinking of the doctrines applicable to 
hearsay evidence is required in both jurisdictions in order to render 
them more principled, more coherent, and therefore more legitimate. 
I. Confrontation Law in the United States 
A. The Source and Content of the American Right to Confront Witnesses 
 In the United States, the right to confront witnesses is enshrined 
within the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.8 
This, the Confrontation Clause, is open to a variety of interpretations—
a reality candidly acknowledged by Justice Antonin Scalia writing for 
the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington.9 Does 
it require that the accused be permitted to test all the evidence against 
him, and that he have a right to cross-examine all those who have made 
statements against him, or simply that the witnesses who actually testify 
in a criminal proceeding against the accused must do so in the pres-
ence of the accused? Not surprisingly, the Court has attempted to clar-
ify the meaning of the somewhat ambiguous Confrontation Clause.10 
 For the purposes of this Article, my intent is not to chronicle the 
evolution of American confrontation jurisprudence, but rather to focus 
on the current content of the law. The most recent changes to confron-
                                                                                                                      
8 U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
9 See 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004). 
10 See, e.g., id. at 43, 50–68. 
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tation law began with the 2004 decision in Crawford, wherein the Court 
dramatically reinterpreted the meaning of the Confrontation Clause 
and overruled its 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts.11 The Roberts decision 
held that out-of-court statements could be admissible in spite of the 
Confrontation Clause so long as they were reliable—that is, as long as 
they either fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or bore “par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”12 Since Crawford overruled 
Roberts, I will begin by discussing Crawford. 
 Crawford concerned the prosecution of Michael Crawford for as-
sault and attempted murder. Crawford allegedly stabbed the victim, 
Kenneth Lee, because Lee had attempted to rape Crawford’s wife, Syl-
via, on an earlier occasion.13 At Crawford’s trial, the prosecution 
sought, and was permitted, to introduce a taped statement that Sylvia 
provided to police in the immediate aftermath of the stabbing.14 The 
statement tended to show that Crawford did not act in self-defense 
when stabbing Lee, but Sylvia did not testify at the trial due to state evi-
dence laws regarding “marital privilege,”15 which barred her testimony 
in this case.16 Crawford was convicted, presumably on the basis of Syl-
via’s statement to the police (among other evidence), but the decision 
was ultimately appealed to the Court to determine whether the admis-
sion of Sylvia’s taped statement violated the Confrontation Clause.17 
 After a lengthy survey of the history and origins of the Confronta-
tion Clause,18 the majority, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, made 
two inferences based on the historical background of the Sixth 
                                                                                                                      
11 See id. at 60–69; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 60–69. In Roberts, the Court articulated the “indicia of reliability” test, holding 
that “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least 
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 448 U.S. at 66. 
12 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
13 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
14 Id. at 40. 
15 Id. Although Justice Scalia used the phrase “marital privilege” in the opinion, the real 
concern was whether Sylvia was competent to testify in the absence of Crawford’s consent, 
rather than whether any aspect of her evidence was privileged. 
16 See Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060(1) (1994) (“A spouse or domestic partner shall not 
be examined for or against his or her spouse or domestic partner, without the consent of 
the spouse or domestic partner.”). In other words, under state evidence law, it falls to the 
accused to determine whether a spouse is competent to testify. See id. 
17 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38–42. 
18 See id. at 43–50. 
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Amendment.19 First, “the principal evil at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and 
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the ac-
cused.”20 This inference led Justice Scalia to conclude that the Sixth 
Amendment primarily implicated “testimonial hearsay,” and not neces-
sarily statements such as “a casual remark to an acquaintance.”21 Sec-
ond, Justice Scalia inferred that “the Framers would not have allowed 
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at 
trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination.”22 Justice Scalia rejected the 
interpretation previously espoused by the Court that evidence might be 
admissible under the Sixth Amendment if it fell within a “‘firmly rooted 
hearsay exception’ or [bore] ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.’”23 On this latter point, Justice Scalia observed that the Framers of 
the Constitution likely did not mean “to leave the Sixth Amendment’s 
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amor-
phous notions of ‘reliability.’”24 He further noted that “[d]ispensing 
with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”25 
 Although Chief Justice William Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion 
joined by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, agreed that Sylvia’s statement 
should not have been admitted, he strongly disagreed with the major-
ity’s decision to overrule Roberts.26 The Chief Justice expressed distaste 
for the majority’s “arbitrary” distinction between testimonial and non-
testimonial hearsay,27 questioned the utility of departing from prece-
dent,28 and referred four times in his brief concurrence to the truth-
seeking function of criminal trials,29 all of which the majority’s new doc-
                                                                                                                      
 
19 Id. at 50. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Crawford, which five other Jus-
tices joined. Id. at 38. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate concurring opinion, which 
Justice O’Connor joined. Id. at 69. 
20 Id. at 50. 
21 See id. at 51, 53. 
22 Id. at 53–54. 
23 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting Roberts, 541 U.S. at 66). 
24 Id. at 61. 
25 Id. at 62. 
26 See id. at 75–76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
27 See id. at 71 (“[A]ny classification of statements as testimonial beyond that of sworn 
affidavits and depositions will be somewhat arbitrary . . . .”). 
28 See id. at 72 (“I see little value in trading our precedent for an imprecise approxima-
tion at this late date.”). 
29 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 74, 75, 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). In 
his concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked:  
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trine would hinder.30 Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist presciently 
suggested that the majority’s opinion might be open to criticism for its 
lack of grounding in precedent and principle: 
Stare decisis is not an inexorable command in the area of con-
stitutional law, but by and large, it “is the preferred course be-
cause it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial deci-
sions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of 
the judicial process.”31 
Ultimately, however, Justice Scalia’s new Confrontation Clause doctrine 
prevailed, thus signaling the end of the reliability-based law for dealing 
with out-of-court statements articulated in Roberts.32 
 In Crawford, one can see the skeleton of a new framework for ap-
plying the Confrontation Clause. The right to confrontation only exists 
in the context of testimonial statements.33 Additionally, a testimonial 
statement may be admissible even where contemporaneous cross-exam-
ination is not possible, so long as the declarant is unable to testify at 
trial, and the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-exam- 
ine the declarant.34 Furthermore, Crawford affirms that in the United 
States, confrontation means only one thing—the opportunity to cross-
examine a witness: 
To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of 
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guar-
antee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that re-
liability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a 
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence 
                                                                                                                      
The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly 
sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the ac-
cused.” By creating an immutable category of excluded evidence, the Court 
adds little to a trial’s truth-finding function and ignores this longstanding 
guidance. 
Id. at 75 (citations omitted) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)). 
30 See id. at 69–76. 
31 Id. at 75 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 828 (1991)). 
32 See id. at 68–69. 
33 Id. 
34 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
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(a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how 
reliability can best be determined.35 
Even after Crawford, however, some ambiguity regarding the scope of 
the Confrontation Clause remained.36 Accordingly, in subsequent deci-
sions, the Court expanded upon the definition of “testimonial” evi-
dence and other relevant confrontation issues.37 
  In Davis v. Washington, the Court considered whether a statement 
made by a victim of assault to the 911 operator who received the vic-
tim’s call was a “testimonial” statement for the purposes of the Con-
frontation Clause.38 The victim, Michelle McCottry, called 911 after 
Adrian Davis punched her several times while at her residence to re-
move his belongings. Police officers arrived on the scene and saw clear 
signs of recent injuries on McCottry. They took a statement from 
McCottry, and charges were later filed against Davis.39 McCottry, how-
ever, did not testify at Davis’s trial40 and, accordingly, the prosecution 
sought, and was permitted, to introduce the 911 recording in order to 
prove the link between Davis and the injuries observed on McCottry.41 
The Court decided Davis together with Hammon v. Indiana,42 a similar 
case with a subtle distinction: In Hammon, the police investigators took 
a statement from the victim of a domestic assault at her house shortly 
after the incident occurred, and, when the victim did not testify at 
Hammon’s trial,43 the prosecution sought, and was permitted, to intro-
duce the victim’s statement through the police officer who received the 
statement.44 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. at 61. 
36 Id. at 60–61. 
37 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1165 (2011) (victim statements to police of-
ficers during an ongoing emergency); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 
2532 (2009) (lab test results); Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682–83 (2008) (de-
ceased victims’ prior statements to police officers); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826–
34 (2006) (911 calls). 
38 See 547 U.S. at 817–18. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 819. The reason why McCottry did not testify is unclear. See id. (“McCottry pre-
sumably could have testified as to whether Davis was her assailant, but she did not ap-
pear.”). 
41 See id. 
42 Davis, 542 U.S. 813 (2006). The Hammon opinion is included in the Davis majority 
opinion. Id. at 819–21. 
43 Id. at 819–20. As in Davis, it is unclear why the victim did not testify. See id. (“Amy was 
subpoenaed, but she did not appear at [Hammon’s] subsequent bench trial.”). 
44 Id. at 820. 
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 The majority opinion in Davis and Hammon, written by Justice 
Scalia, distinguished between the two types of statements made to au-
thorities in the following manner: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of po-
lice interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable po-
lice assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testi-
monial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there 
is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events poten-
tially relevant to later criminal prosecution.45 
Whereas the Court in Davis held that the victim’s statement to a 911 
operator was non-testimonial, and therefore not subject to exclusion 
under the Confrontation Clause, the Court in Hammon held that the 
victim’s statement to police investigators was clearly testimonial in na-
ture; therefore, it should have been excluded at Hammon’s trial be-
cause the accused was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant about her statement.46 
 Justice Clarence Thomas dissented in part in Davis and Hammon. 
He suggested that the majority’s definition of testimonial evidence was 
overbroad,47 and argued that it would “yield[] no predictable results to 
police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law.”48 
He also noted the difficulty of singling out the function of a police offi-
cer at the time a statement is taken: 
In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report 
of a crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or 
otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the 
perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emer-
gency situation and to gather evidence.49 
Justice Thomas concluded that neither the statement to the 911 opera-
tor in Davis, nor the statement to police in Hammon, was sufficiently 
formalized to be a testimonial statement.50 Consequently, Justice Tho-
                                                                                                                      
 
45 Id. at 822. 
46 Id. at 834. 
47 See id. at 835 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
48 Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
49 Id. at 839. 
50 Id. at 840. Justice Thomas wrote: 
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mas agreed that the statement in Davis should be admitted, but dis-
agreed that the statement in Hammon should have been excluded.51 Al-
though Justice Thomas was alone in his partial dissent, many of his con-
cerns about the distinction between the testimonial or non-testimonial 
nature of different types of statements received by police re-emerged in 
Michigan v. Bryant, discussed below.52 
 In the meantime, however, another domestic violence case, Giles v. 
California, further refined American confrontation doctrine.53 Dwayne 
Giles was charged with murder after fatally shooting his ex-girlfriend 
Brenda Avie six times. Giles alleged that he fired in self-defense when 
Avie rushed at him, because he knew that Avie had previously killed a 
man and claimed that she was jealous and violent.54 The prosecution, 
however, sought, and was permitted, to introduce a statement that Avie 
made to police three weeks before her death when the police re-
sponded to a domestic violence call.55 At that time, Avie told police that 
Giles choked her, punched her in the face, and opened a folding knife 
in front of her while saying that he would kill her if he found out she 
was cheating on him.56 The jury convicted Giles of first-degree mur-
der,57 presumably on the basis of the statement that the deceased victim 
previously made to police concerning Giles’s threats on her life.58 
 In Giles, the Court expanded upon its statement in Crawford that 
“the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes 
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds,”59 by deciding 
whether Giles forfeited his right to confrontation by killing Avie.60 A 
                                                                                                                      
Neither the 911 call at issue in Davis nor the police questioning at issue in 
Hammon is testimonial under the appropriate framework. Neither the call nor 
the questioning is itself a formalized dialogue. Nor do any circumstances sur-
rounding the taking of the statements render those statements sufficiently 
formal to resemble the Marian examinations. 
Id. Justice Thomas explained the “Marian” examinations, referred to by Justice Scalia in 
the majority opinion, in more detail; these examinations are essentially ex parte examina-
tions of witnesses in the style of the civil law, authorized by bail and committal statutes 
passed in England during the reign of Queen Mary. Id. at 835. 
51 Id. at 842. 
52 Id. at 834; see infra text accompanying notes 80–97. 
53 See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 2681–82. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 2682. 
58 See id. at 2681–82. 
59 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
60 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681. 
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majority of the Court agreed with Justice Scalia that an exception to the 
Confrontation Clause exists where an accused forfeits his right to con-
frontation as a result of his own wrongdoing, but that this exception 
would only apply in cases where it could be shown that the accused in-
tended to make the witness unavailable for trial.61 Thus, the exception 
would cover obvious witness intimidation and witness tampering situa-
tions, but not murder, unless the specific intent of the accused to ren-
der the witness unavailable could be proven.62 The majority in Giles also 
affirmed that an exception to the Confrontation Clause existed for “dy-
ing declarations,”63 but justified its recognition of both the forfeiture 
and the dying declarations exceptions on the ground that both excep-
tions clearly existed “at the time of the founding,”64 that is, at the time 
of the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. 
 The Justices authored five opinions in Giles: Chief Justice John 
Roberts joined in the opinion by Justice Scalia;65 Justice Thomas reiter-
ated that non-formalized statements to police are not subject to the 
Sixth Amendment, but, since the Court was not asked to rule on this 
question in Giles, he agreed with the result;66 Justice Samuel Alito con-
curred in much the same manner as Justice Thomas;67 Justice David 
Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred in the result, 
but argued that the specific intent aspect of the forfeiture doctrine 
could be inferred in cases of domestic violence, or “classic” abusive re-
lations where the abuser intends to “isolate the victim from outside 
help”;68 and, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Ste-
vens and Anthony Kennedy, dissented.69 The dissenting justices would 
not read a specific intent requirement into the forfeiture doctrine, pre-
ferring instead a lesser requirement of a general intent to do some-
thing that would make the witness unavailable.70 These justices would 
therefore have allowed the admission of hearsay statements in Giles, 
because the defendant forfeited his confrontation rights when he killed 
the victim/witness.71 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. at 2681, 2693. 
62 Id. at 2684, 2693. 
63 See id. at 2682–85. 
64 See id. at 2693. 
65 Id. at 2681. 
66Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693–94 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
67 Id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring). 
68 Id. at 2694–95 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
69 Id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
70 See id. at 2698–99. 
71 See id. at 2695. 
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 Ultimately, the admission at trial of Avie’s previous statement, 
without a determination as to whether Giles intended to make Avie un-
available to testify, violated Giles’s constitutional right to confront wit-
nesses against him, thus invoking the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing excep-
tion to the Confrontation Clause.72 The case was “remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with” the majority opinion.73 
 American confrontation law continued to evolve as the Court faced 
a number of cases that required it to clarify and flesh out the Crawford 
doctrine. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, decided in 2009, a bare ma-
jority of the Court—agreeing with an opinion that was again written by 
Justice Scalia—concluded that certificates of analysis from drug labora-
tories were “testimonial” evidence for the purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause because the sole purpose of the certificates under Massachusetts 
law was to provide evidence of the composition and weight of the 
drugs.74 The majority opinion in this case quickly established that lab 
certificates were testimonial, and proceeded, for the remainder of the 
opinion, to explain why “the sky will not fall after today’s decision,”75 in 
direct response to arguments by Massachusetts76 and the dissenting Jus-
tices suggesting that, for efficiency reasons, the nationwide volume of 
drug trials required the admission of certificates instead of live testi-
mony.77 The majority was not persuaded by these arguments, and ulti-
mately ruled that the certificates of analysis should not have been admit-
ted at Melendez-Diaz’s trial for drug trafficking.78 The matter was 
                                                                                                                      
72 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684 (Scalia, J., majority opinion). 
73 Id. at 2693. 
74 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531–32. 
75 See id. at 2540. The Court explained: 
Perhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall after today’s decision is 
that it has not done so already. Many States have already adopted the consti-
tutional rule we announce today, while many others permit the defendant to 
assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause right after receiving no-
tice of the prosecution’s intent to use a forensic analyst’s report. Despite these 
widespread practices, there is no evidence that the criminal justice system has 
ground to a halt in the States that, one way or another, empower a defendant 
to insist upon the analyst’s appearance at trial. 
Id. at 2540–41 (citations omitted). 
76 It seems likely that the United States (as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, 
supporting Massachusetts) would echo the arguments raised by Massachusetts at the Court 
hearing, since the federal Drug Enforcement Agency would surely have been concerned 
about the impact of the decision in this case on their work. 
77 See id., 129 S. Ct. at 2540. 
78 See id. at 2540–42. 
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remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the majority’s 
opinion.79 
 Another of the Court’s recent significant decisions on confronta-
tion law, Michigan v. Bryant, was decided on February 28, 2011.80 This 
case involved the alleged murder of Anthony Covington by Richard 
Bryant. Police responded to an emergency call indicating that someone 
had been shot, and found Covington at a gas station with a gunshot 
wound in his abdomen. Police immediately asked Covington who had 
shot him, and where the shooting occurred. Covington replied that 
“Rick” (Bryant) shot him at Bryant’s house. Police then proceeded to 
Bryant’s residence and found a gunshot hole through the back door, a 
bullet on the ground, and blood on the back porch. Covington subse-
quently died in the hospital.81 At trial, the police officer who received 
the statements made by Covington prior to his death testified as to the 
substance of those statements.82 A jury convicted Bryant of second-
degree murder.83 
 The Court was asked to decide whether Covington’s statements 
were properly admitted through the police officer.84 A majority opin-
ion, written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, held that the statements to the 
police officer were non-testimonial, and were therefore not capable of 
implicating the Confrontation Clause.85 The majority reiterated the 
distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence as previ-
ously drawn in Davis,86 namely that statements to police in response to 
an ongoing emergency are non-testimonial, but statements to the po-
lice for the purpose of proving past events in contemplation of future 
criminal proceedings are testimonial.87 Furthermore, in delineating 
the line between an investigation and a response to an ongoing emer-
gency, the majority observed that “[t]he circumstances in which an en-
counter occurs—e.g., at or near the scene of the crime versus at a po-
lice station, during an ongoing emergency or afterwards—are clearly 
matters of objective fact,”88 and “the duration and scope of an emer-
                                                                                                                      
79 Id. at 2542. 
80 131 S. Ct. at 1143. 
81 Id. at 1150. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1152. 
85 Id. at 1166–67. 
86 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1153–54; Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
87 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1153–54. 
88 Id. at 1156. 
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gency may depend in part on the type of weapon employed.”89 Based 
on these observations, the majority held that the police faced an ongo-
ing emergency when Convington made his statements, because they 
did not know whether the shooter was still a threat and because the 
case involved a gun.90 As the majority noted, “[i]f an out-of-sight sniper 
pauses between shots, no one would say that the emergency ceases dur-
in he pause.”g t
reliability into the Craw-
rd 
                                                                                                                     
91 
 Interestingly, Justice Scalia wrote a lengthy and scathing dissent in 
Bryant,92 highlighting the fact that at least five different police officers 
interrogated Covington during the “ongoing emergency,” each inter-
rogation occurred at least twenty-five minutes after Covington had been 
shot, and not one of these officers asked the most logical question in 
response to a true emergency (“Where is the shooter?”).93 Justice Scalia 
would have decided this “absurdly easy case”94 by characterizing Cov-
ington’s statement to the police as testimonial, thereby rendering it in-
admissible due to the lack of opportunity for confrontation.95 Justice 
Scalia’s main thematic concern in his dissent was that the Court was 
creating “a revisionist narrative in which reliability continues to guide 
our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, at least where emergencies 
and faux emergencies are concerned,”96 and he argued that the Court 
was attempting “to fit its resurrected interest in 
fo framework, but the result is incoherent.”97 
 
89 Id. at 1158. 
90 Id. at 1163–64. 
91 Id. at 1164. 
92 Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The opening lines of Justice Scalia’s dissent read 
as follows: 
Today’s tale—a story of five officers conducting successive examinations of a 
dying man with the primary purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his tes-
timony regarding his killer, but of protecting him, them, and others from a 
murderer somewhere on the loose—is so transparently false that professing to 
believe it demeans this institution. But reaching a patently incorrect conclu-
sion on the facts is a relatively benign judicial mischief; it affects, after all, 
only the case at hand. In its vain attempt to make the incredible plausible, 
however—or perhaps as an intended second goal—today’s opinion distorts 
our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles. Instead 
of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort. 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168. 
93 See id. at 1170–72. 
94 Id. at 1170, 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
95 See id. at 1171. 
96 See id. at 1174. 
97 See id. at 1175. 
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 In summary, it is clear that, beginning with Crawford in 2004, the 
Court created a categorical exclusionary rule for testimonial evidence 
when a declarant is unavailable to be contemporaneously cross-
examined, and even for testimonial evidence where a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination existed, unless the declarant was truly unavailable 
to testify in person at the subsequent trial.98 Several cases since 2004, 
most authored by Justice Scalia, refined this rule by amplifying the dis-
tinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence and affirm-
ing the residual exceptions for dying declarations and forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.99 As Bryant indicates, however, the law in this area may 
continue to evolve, particularly if Justice Scalia’s dominant philosophy 
regarding confrontation jurisprudence loses favor with current mem-
bers of
usion’ into a ‘rule of admission,’ a rule that allows the in-
                                                                                                                     
 the Court.100 
B. Critiquing the Coherence of American Confrontation Doctrine 
 The preceding overview of American case law was necessarily de-
tailed due to the rapid recent development of the law. It is also impor-
tant to note that the above discussion relates only to Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, and not to hearsay law more gen-
erally. It should be recalled that, in order for a statement to be admissi-
ble in a criminal trial, it is not sufficient for the statement to simply con-
form to the requirements of the Constitution; the statement must also 
be admissible under normal rules of evidence, including rules pertain-
ing to hearsay statements.101 Thus, the concepts of hearsay and confron-
tation remain fundamentally associated, even in the post-Crawford era.102 
That said, codified rules of evidence in the United States contain nu-
merous exceptions to the general exclusionary rule applicable to hear-
say.103 Commentators suggest that hearsay rules are mainly enabling 
rules: “Cumulatively, it is said, the exceptions have turned hearsay from 
a ‘rule of excl
troduction of ‘virtually any hearsay statement that has probative 
value.’”104 
 
98 See Crawford, 541 U.S. 68–69. 
99 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165; Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532; Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 
2682–83; Davis, 547 U.S. at 813, 826–34. 
100 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164–65; see also id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
101 See David A. Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 53. 
102 Id. at 54–55. 
103 Id. at 13 (“The Federal Rules of Evidence codify some three dozen exceptions to 
the prohibition of hearsay.”). 
104 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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 Thus, with an appreciation for how the Confrontation Clause 
dominates, but does not fully occupy, the field of law relating to out-of-
court statements in the United States, and with a solid understanding 
of the governing American confrontation doctrine, it is now possible to 
assess the internal coherence of the law and the attempts at justifica-
nst him in a trial, where 
os
which one interprets a right to confrontation. For instance, if we put 
tion. 
1. “Confronted with the Witnesses Against Him”: A Textual Critique 
 From a grammatical and plain language perspective, it is not im-
mediately apparent that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal 
defendant any cross-examination right under any circumstances.105 As 
an illustration of this point, consider the difference between the follow-
ing two sentences: 1) The accused shall enjoy the right to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; and, 2) The accused shall enjoy 
the right to confront with the witnesses against him. In the first sen-
tence, the action (confrontation) is carried out by the witnesses, and 
the accused is merely the object of the action—the one who will be 
confronted. In the second sentence, however, the accused is the subject 
of the sentence—the one who carries out the confrontation— and the 
witnesses are merely the object of the sentence upon whom the action 
is carried out. In the first sentence, the plain language tells us that any 
confrontation in a trial is actually done by the witnesses, who must 
come face-to-face with the defendant in order to accuse and bear wit-
ness against him.106 As a corollary to the preceding proposition, the 
first sentence also suggests that any reciprocal right of the accused to 
cross-examine the witnesses who confront him at trial cannot be 
sourced expressly from the text of the first sentence; if such a right ex-
ists, then it must be implied from some extra-textual source. In the sec-
ond sentence, however, it is clear that the accused is granted a right to 
confront, accuse, and defy the witnesses agai
cr s-examination of the witnesses would logically be the vehicle 
through which this confrontation is achieved. 
 This subtle grammatical distinction can drastically alter the way in 
                                                                                                                      
105 See U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
106 See id. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “confront” in the following ways: 
“esp. To face in hostility or defiance; to present a bold front to, stand against, oppose,” 
and, “To face as an accuser or as a witness in a trial.” See 3 Oxford English Dictionary 
719 (2d ed. 1989). 
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aside the issue of whether “originalism”107 is a valid and appropriate 
interpretive technique for expounding a constitution, then the above 
grammatical analysis—wherein the first sentence mirrors the text of the 
Confrontation Clause—should cause us to question whether the Fram-
ers of the Sixth Amendment intended to grant accused persons a right 
to cross-examine witnesses, or whether they simply intended to grant 
accused persons the right to be brought face-to-face with the trial wit-
nesses who would actually confront the accused with their incriminat-
ing evidence. It is neither far-fetched nor redundant to suggest that the 
Framers intended the Confrontation Clause to provide an accused with 
the more limited right simply to be present at trial; after all, such a 
right is not provided for explicitly within any other part of the U.S. 
Constitution.108 Furthermore, as Justice Scalia noted in Crawford, “the 
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the 
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 
parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”109 Justice Scalia, 
however, does not explain in any meaningful detail why the Framers 
intended to prevent ex parte examinations (for instance, to prevent 
                                                                                                                      
107 There is likely no single accepted understanding of what the term originalism 
mean s has 
been 
iginal-
8 (2011). In other words, originalism is concerned with establish-
ing 
endment to the U.S. Constitution, not because the text of the Constitution explic-
itly pr , 579 
(1884
s, but the general thrust of the idea in both its older and its more recent variant
described by Peter J. Smith in How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?: 
The “old originalism,” which tended to focus on the intent of the Framers 
and was largely a negative theory developed to criticize the decisions of the 
Warren and Burger Courts, has been mostly displaced by the “new or
ism,” which tends to focus on the objective meaning of the constitutional text 
and seeks to provide a positive basis for constitutional decisionmaking. 
62 Hastings L.J. 707, 70
the original meaning of a constitutional provision so that the meaning can be applied 
in contemporary cases. 
108 Although the right to be present at one’s trial is constitutionally protected in the 
United States, this is because the right has been read into the due process clause of the 
Fifth Am
ovides for such a right. See Hopt v. People of the Territory of Utah, 10 U.S. 574
): 
The legislature has deemed it essential to the protection of one whose life or 
liberty is involved in a prosecution for felony, that he shall be personally pre-
sent at the trial, that is, at every stage of the trial when his substantial rights 
may be affected by the proceedings against him. If he be deprived of his life 
or liberty without being so present, such deprivation would be without that 
due process of law required by the Constitution. 
Id. 
0. 109 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 5
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unreliable evidence from reaching the trier of fact).110 Instead, it seems 
to satisfy the Crawford majority that the Framers did intend to prevent 
the admission of ex parte examinations, and this fact, alone, drives the 
majority’s reasoning.111 If the mischief to be avoided by the Confronta-
tion Clause is ex parte examinations, simpliciter, then it would make 
sense for the Sixth Amendment to guarantee accused persons a right to 
have witnesses testify in their presence, and nothing more.112 In other 
words, on the basis of the historical facts accepted by the Crawford ma-
jority, and particularly on the basis of the text of the Confrontation 
Clause, it would have been plausible for the majority in that case to find 
that no right to cross-examine witnesses regarding testimonial or non-
testimonial evidence is protected by the Sixth Amendment.113 Instead, 
e m
expounding the American Constitution is not accepted as a valid inter-
                                                                                                                     
th ajority could reasonably have found that the Confrontation Clause 
only guarantees an accused the right to be present at her trial, face-to-
face with the witnesses against her.114 
 Even if one is not persuaded by this textual critique of American 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, there remains some ambiguity 
about the definition of the term “witnesses” within the context of the 
Sixth Amendment.115 As Justice Scalia observed in Crawford, “[o]ne 
could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to mean those who 
actually testify at trial, those whose statements are offered at trial, or 
something in-between.”116 In order to resolve this ambiguity, Justice 
Scalia looked to “the historical background of the Clause to understand 
its meaning,”117 and concluded, as discussed above, that “witnesses” 
means anyone who gives “testimonial” evidence, either inside or out-
side of court.118 If Justice Scalia’s originalist approach in this case to 
 
discussing historical denunciation of ex parte procedures without 
spec unjust). 
t 47–49. 
d Purpose of the Confrontation Clause, 
60 S ) (challenging use of the Fifth Amendment defini-
tion  Amendment context). 
1 U.S. at 42–43. 
itted). 
110 Cf. id. at 42–50 (
ifying why they are 
111 See id. a
112 See id. at 42–50. 
113 Cf. id. 
114 I would like to note that many others have offered textual critiques of various Con-
frontation Clause doctrines. However, most critiques appear to focus on the meaning of 
the word “witness,” one who gives in-court testimony versus anyone who offers evidence, 
rather than on the grammatical structure of the Clause and the meaning that can be in-
ferred from this structure. See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., Crawford’s Aftershock: Aligning the 
Regulation of Non-Testimonial Hearsay with the History an
tan. L. Rev. 1497, 1508–12 (2008
 of “testimony” in the Sixth
115 See Crawford, 54
116 Id. (citations om
117 See id. at 43. 
118 See id. at 51–52. 
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pretive technique, or if he is incorrect in his assessment of relevant his-
torical realities119—which lead him to suggest that ex parte examina-
tions, simpliciter, were the primary evil that the Confrontation Clause 
sought to address)—then one can see how the definition of “witnesses” 
for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause might mean something 
ltog
ot necessarily the most 
logical or persuasive meaning for the Clause, since, as I will explain be-
a ether different from, but just as legitimate as, that which Crawford 
tells us the term now means. 
 As the above textual critiques of American confrontation law dem-
onstrate, the text of the Sixth Amendment is capable of supporting a 
variety of meanings. The Court, in its most recent line of Confrontation 
Clause cases, derived a meaning for the clause by hypothesizing about 
the original intent of the Framers. This meaning, when compared with 
various other textually plausible meanings, is n
low, it cannot be justified by legal principles. 
2. Artificial Distinctions and Exceptions: A Principled Critique 
 One can easily claim that an originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation, and specifically interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause, is a principled approach—the relevant principle being that the 
Framers’ intent at the time of founding should determine the meaning 
of the clause.120 Even if this interpretive methodology reflects a “prin-
cipled” approach, however, the approach is arguably based on political 
principles, not legal principles.121 For instance, if one were to defend 
                                                                                                                      
119 See Sklansky, supra note 101, at 47 (“The originalist reasoning in Crawford, Davis, 
and Giles has been challenged on two main grounds. The first is that originalism is a mis-
taken approach to constitutional interpretation; the second is that the Court is wrong 
about what kind of evidence was commonly allowed by eighteenth-century common law.”). 
120 See, e.g., Crawford 541 U.S. at 50–56. 
121 Professor Richard Fallon has gone so far as to suggest that political principles and 
originalist interpretations may be inextricably linked. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist 
Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 5, 19 (2011). Fallon states: 
[E]ven in the Founding generation . . . reasonable people reasonably dis-
agreed in light of their reasonable but divergent political outlooks. It is no 
small challenge to specify the rules by which to determine what a hypothetical 
reasonable observer would have concluded with regard to questions that were 
not clearly foreseen and that understandably provoke, or would historically 
have provoked, ideologically inflected disagreement. In addressing that chal-
lenge, a fully specified originalist theory might actually need to identify the 
political values or concerns to be attributed to the hypothetical reasonable 
observers whose views define the original public meaning. 
Id. 
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an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, one would 
likely argue that it is politically unacceptable for the courts to create 
new constitutional law in cases where such judicial activism is not neces-
sary and where an existing answer to a legal question can be found by 
asking what the Framers of the Constitution intended the answer to 
be.122 The role of creating constitutional law, an originalist might say, 
should be reserved unto the polity as whole, and implemented through 
the actions of elected officials, not through the judiciary.123 This type of 
response is concerned more with the political legitimacy of lawmaking 
than with the soundness of legal decisions, as assessed in reference to 
legal principles.124 In other words, an originalist response to the ques-
on,
onfrontation 
w—
ti  “why does the Confrontation Clause only protect testimonial evi-
dence?” (as demonstrated implicitly in the Crawford opinion) could 
simply be, “because the Framers wanted it that way.” 
 This answer—while it may or may not be historically accurate— 
does not allow for meaningful legal debate125 through an ongoing 
process of justification, critique, and counter-justification, as to why the 
law is the way it is, whether the law does what it is supposed to do, and, 
if not, whether the law should be fine-tuned. In my view, a more useful 
answer to the same question (for instance, “because this type of evi-
dence presents the greatest danger of unreliability, and reliable evi-
dence is essential in order for a trial to achieve its truth-seeking pur-
pose”) would refer to legal principles that can be debated in the 
interest of understanding, applying, and shaping the law. Thus, at the 
outset, one can critique the current state of American c
la law that was created through originalist interpretation—by argu-
ing that it is not a principled body of law because it does not draw upon 
legal principles as a source of justification for its content. 
 Even if one accepts, as Richard Fallon suggests, that originalism as 
a doctrine of constitutional interpretation has “the capacity for princi-
                                                                                                                      
122 See Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Tri-
umph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 Geo. L.J. 183, 188 (2005). 
Biba inalists believe “the job of judges is archaeology, not architecture: 
they must discover meaning, not invent it.” Id. 
provision car-
ried med—is a historical phenomenon. As such, it can be 
esta e,” rather than by legal debate. Id. 
s asserts that orig
123 Id. at 186–88. 
124 Id. at 188. 
125 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know and When Did They Know It? Fic-
tional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 105, 105 (2005). Davies 
claims that “[o]riginal meaning—the public meaning that a constitutional 
 at the time the provision was fra
blished only by valid historical evidenc
414 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:395 
pled application,”126 it seems unlikely that such applications can be 
found in prevailing Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.127 As Fallon 
notes, generally, “more specified originalist theories are likely to be 
more principled than less specified theories,”128 but “many originalists’ 
working theories—as manifest by the judgments they reach about par-
ticular cases and the arguments they adduce to support their judg-
ments—are poorly specified.”129 Fallon further suggests that Justice 
Scalia, the primary author of the recent authoritative string of Confron-
tation Clause decisions, is particularly notorious for being an unprinci-
pled originalist: “[W]ell-developed literature supports the conclusion 
at
alist judges like Justice Scalia, who 
te
th  Justices Scalia and Thomas are not consistent in the versions of 
originalism that they employ—presumably because their theories are 
not sufficiently specified to constrain them from varying.”130 
 As evidence in support of this observation, Fallon notes that both 
Justices Scalia and Thomas routinely vote in ways that prioritize the 
value of precedent, even when these votes “seem impossible to justify by 
reference to originally understood meanings,”131 but that on other oc-
casions, the two Justices “have voted to overrule longstanding prece-
dents on the sole ground that they deviate from the original under-
standing.”132 The problematic element of this voting pattern, from 
Fallon’s perspective and from the perspective of any critic who espouses 
principled legal decision-making, is that there is no “well-developed, 
articulated theory of when and why non-originalist precedent should 
control.”133 In other words, origin
of n make decisions on an ad hoc basis without reference to underlying 
legal principles, may be causing law (including evidence law) to con-
tinue “adrift” and directionless.134 
 If one values principled judicial decision-making, therefore, it 
would seem that originalism in general, and Justice Scalia’s variant of 
originalism in particular, are poor interpretative tools for deciding con-
stitutional cases. With respect to current American Confrontation 
Clause doctrine, the lack of underlying legal principles—and the prob-
                                                                                                                      
126 Fallon, supra note 121, at 15. 
127 See Davies, supra note 125, at 192. 
128 See Fallon, supra note 121, at 15. 
129 Id. at 16. 
130 Id. (footnote omitted). 
131 Id. at 18. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Cf. Davies, supra note 125, at 213–15 (criticizing the tendency of originalists to re-
vise history to fit predetermined outcomes). 
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lems that this absence creates—manifests itself in a variety of ways. For 
instance, the Court’s distinction between testimonial and non-testi-
monial evidence for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause appears 
arbitrary because there is no logical reason why one type of evidence 
should garner constitutional protection while the other does not.135 If 
the ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure that evidence 
nities for cross-examination, and 
ince rize 
state ests 
that ma-
nipu
ity standards for 
                                                                            
is reliable, which it was for many pre-Crawford decisions and which even 
Justice Scalia acknowledged in Crawford,136 then why should non-
testimonial evidence be admitted without “testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination”137 as the Sixth Amendment seemingly requires? 
 This unprincipled development in the law that follows from Craw-
ford will likely reduce many opportu
ntivize police forces and lower courts to obtain and characte
ments as non-testimonial.138 In fact, one commentator sugg
the testimonial/non-testimonial distinction is already being 
lated to achieve desired results: 
These distinctions have been seized on by lower courts, which 
have read expansively the Davis criterion of emergency state-
ments as nontestimonial and have emphasized any conceiv-
able purpose for the interview as noninterrogation to remove 
hearsay declarations from Crawford’s Confrontation strictures. 
Both the de-constitutionalizing of admissibil
nontestimonial hearsay and the expansive definition being 
applied to that category of out-of-court statements will permit 
trials to be conducted with significant testimony never sub-
jected to the testing of cross-examination.139 
 Jules Epstein’s comments in the above passage predate Bryant, but 
the phenomenon that he describes is evidently not just occurring in 
lower courts.140 Notably, the majority in Bryant went to great lengths to 
characterize the situation that the police officers faced as an “ongoing 
                                          
ility be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible 
of c ation.”) 
ly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and 
“At 41–42 (2009). 
, Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1167. 
135 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
136 See id. (“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, 
but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence 
be reliable, but that reliab
ross-examin
137 See id. 
138 See Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seeming
Risk,” 14 Widener L. Rev. 427, 4
139 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
140 See, e.g.
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emergency,”141 even though, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, 
the statements given to five different police officers were elicited be-
tween twenty-five and thirty-five minutes after the victim had been shot, 
they were made about six blocks away from the scene of the shooting, 
and none of the officers demonstrated any significant concern for their 
own safety or the safety of the public.142 Perhaps some unacknowledged 
principle motivated the majority to conclude that, notwithstanding the 
obviously testimonial nature of the victim’s statements in Bryant and the 
absence of any true ongoing emergency, there was nonetheless an im-
portant reason why the victim’s statements should be admitted without 
opportunity for cross-examination.143 Unless the principles that under-
in 
                                                                                                                     
p these judicial decisions are explicitly acknowledged, however, the 
courts may appear, as the Supreme Court did in Bryant, to manipulate 
facts and law arbitrarily so as to achieve results that cannot be justified 
on a principled basis. 
 Further examples of the unprincipled nature of current American 
confrontation law are evident in the exceptions to the general exclu-
sion of testimonial evidence for dying declarations and forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.144 The Court recognizes these exceptions not because 
they advance the goal of the Confrontation Clause in any independent 
way, but because “the Confrontation Clause is ‘most naturally read as a 
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only 
those exceptions established at the time of the founding.’”145 Can it 
really be principled to accept these exceptions to the general exclu-
sionary rule simply because they existed when the Sixth Amendment 
was written, without first inquiring as to whether they support the right 
that the Confrontation Clause seeks to protect? It seems likely that the 
principle underlying the exception as it was originally understood may 
have changed over time; for example, the historic notion that dying 
declarations are inherently reliable because “no one would wish to 
meet his Maker with a lie on his lips”146 may no longer be persuasive in 
an era when a population is less religious and/or devout than in the 
past. If it is possible that the rationale underlying an exception at the 
 
141 See id. 
142 See id. at 1170–72. 
143 See id. at 1168. 
144 See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682–83. 
145 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. 
146 Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Right Across the Systemic Divide, in Crime, 
Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context: Essays in 
Honour of Professor Mirjan Damaška 261, 266 n.18 ( John Jackson et al. eds., 2008). 
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tim  of the founding is no longer applicable due to any one of a num-
ber of historical, social, political, or legal facts, then it would seem in-
herently unprincipled to incorporate such an exception into contem-
porary law without a proper assessment of the logical validity of the 
exception. 
 My point in drawing attention to the above examples, each of 
which lack an underlying legal principle, is not, at this point, to suggest 
what principle or principles should animate the development of 
American Confro
e
ntation Clause jurisprudence.147 Instead, I simply wish 
 po
 be seen as 
unfortunate and regrettable in a society that values the communication 
and free exchange of ideas within the public intellectual market-
plac 150 Accordingly, Part III of this Article proposes a solution to the 
                             
to int out the lack of internal coherence within the current doctrine, 
with its artificial distinctions between various types of testimony, its po-
tential to encourage results-oriented analysis, and its bizarre recogni-
tion of exceptions that do not seem to advance the goal of the Sixth 
Amendment.148 
 Where the law developed so clearly from originalist constitutional 
interpretations, and in the absence of governing legal principles, it be-
comes almost impossible to engage in reasoned legal debate about the 
law. We can certainly engage in an extensive historical debate about 
what the common law of confrontation looked like at the time of the 
founding, and many commentators have engaged in just such a de-
bate,149 but within the current American confrontation landscape, we 
cannot really argue about whether or not the law should be a certain 
way on the basis of purely legal grounds. This reality should
e.
                                                                                         
he types of principles that might prove 
instr
147 Part III of this paper will discuss more fully t
uctive when considering any type of confrontation law analysis. 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 105–146. 
149 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of Giles’s 
Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or Were Not “at the Time of the Founding,” 13 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 605, 626–27 (2009) (noting, among other things, that only sworn and con-
fronted prior testimony was admissible under the forfeiture doctrine over much of the last 
200 years); Tom Harbinson, Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington’s Originalism: 
Historical Arguments Showing Child Abuse Victims’ Statements to Physicians Are Nontestimonial and 
Admissible as an Exception to the Confrontation Clause, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 569, 572–79 (2007) 
(identifying contradictory precedent undermining Scalia’s justification for the Confronta-
tion Clause); Ellen Liang Yee, Forfeiture of the Confrontation Right in Giles: Justice Scalia’s 
Faint-Hearted Fidelity to the Common Law, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1495, 1507–12 
(2010) (arguing that a clear requirement of specific intent to make a witness unavailable 
for trial was not a historic requirement of the common law in invoking the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule). 
150 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It 
is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-place of ideas in 
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current problem for use in inter-
ret
ly in terms of democratic and socio-economic development. As I 
will explain below, however, Canada and the United States protect a 
criminal defe ry different 
ways. 
 by suggesting appropriate principles 
p ing the Confrontation Clause and similar bodies of law. 
II. Confrontation Law in Canada 
 A comparison between American and Canadian confrontation law 
may prove useful because both jurisdictions draw their legal origins 
from the English common law tradition and both are similarly situated 
global
ndant’s ability to cross-examine witnesses in ve
A. The Source and Content of the Law in Canada 
1. Sourcing the Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses 
 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter),151 
which forms part of the Canadian Constitution, expressly guarantees 
that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice.”152 More specifically, in the context 
of criminal law, section 11(d) of the Charter provides that “[a]ny per-
son charged with an offence has the right . . . to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.”153 The Canadian Constitution 
does not explicitly provide an accused with a right to confront wit-
n es, nor with a right to cross-examine witnesses.ess 154 The above two 
Charter sections provide, however, in a circuitous fashion, a quasi-
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.155 
 The text of section 11(d) of the Charter expressly provides an ac-
cused with the right to a fair trial.156 The Supreme Court of Canada 
(SCC), however, determined that all of the rights listed in sections 8 
through 14 of the Charter are simply examples of the principles of 
                                                                                                                      
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that 
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.”). 
151 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, be-
ing Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter]. 
152 Id. § 7. 
153 Id. § 11(d). 
154 Cf. id. (omitting mention of confrontation right as an enumerated legal right). 
155 See infra text accompanying notes 165–181. 
156 Canadian Charter, supra note 151, § 11(d). 
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fundamental justice that are referred to more generally in section 7: 
“The sections which follow § 7, like the right to a fair trial enshrined in 
§ 11 the 
discu ere, 
the S
(d), reflect particular principles of fundamental justice. Thus 
ssion of § 7 and § 11(d) is inextricably intertwined.”157 Elsewh
CC noted that: 
[T]he legal rights set out in §§ 8 through 14 of the Charter 
address, among other things, specific deprivations of the right 
to life, liberty and security of the person in breach of the 
principles of fundamental justice, and that these provisions 
are therefore illustrative of the meaning of the principles of 
fundamental justice. Similarly, all of the legal rights provisions 
are to be informed in their interpretation and application by 
the principles of fundamental justice. In particular, §§ 7 
through 14 are informed by the cardinal principles of the 
presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial.158 
As these passages demonstrate, a right to a fair trial is a primary right 
that is protected under both section 7 and section 11(d) of the Char-
ter.159 
 sec-
tion full 
answ
A closely related right determined by the SCC to exist under 
7 of the Charter is the right of an accused person to make a 
er and defense to any charges: 
The right to make full answer and defence is protected under 
s. 7 of the Charter. It is one of the principles of fundamental 
justice . . . . The right to make full answer and defence mani-
fests itself in several more specific rights and principles, such 
as the right to full and timely disclosure . . . as well as various 
rights of cross-examination, among others. The right is inte-
grally linked to other principles of fundamental justice, such 
as the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and 
the principle against self-incrimination.160 
While there is a hint in the above passage that cross-examination is a 
part of the right to make a full answer and defense—which, in turn, is a 
pri ed more explic-
     
nciple of fundamental justice—this connection is stat
                                                                                                                 
157 R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, 603 (citations omitted). 
158 R. v. Rose, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, para. 95 (citations omitted). 
159 See Rose, [1998] S.C.R. para. 95; Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 603. 
160 See Rose, [1998] S.C.R. para. 98. 
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itly in other decisions.161 For instance, in R. v. Lyttle,162 the opening 
paragraphs of the unanimous SCC decision describe cross-examination 
in th  
omponent of the right to make full answer and de-
nneces-
iness and inaccuracy within witness testimony, but also ob-
serve
le of fundamental justice, is the end that must 
e following manner: 
 Cross-examination may often be futile and sometimes prove 
fatal, but it remains nonetheless a faithful friend in the pursuit 
of justice and an indispensable ally in the search for truth. At 
times, there will be no other way to expose falsehood, to rectify 
error, to correct distortion or to elicit vital information that 
would otherwise remain forever concealed. That is why the 
right of an accused to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecu-
tion—without significant and unwarranted constraint—is an 
essential c
fence.163 
In Lyttle, the SCC allowed the accused’s appeal and ordered a new trial 
because, on the facts of the case, the accused was unable to exercise his 
right to make a full answer and defense when the trial judge u
sarily curtailed the scope of the defense’s cross-examination.164 
 R. v. Khelawon provided a further articulation of the relationship 
between cross-examination and constitutionally protected rights.165 In 
that case, the SCC noted the value of cross-examination in highlighting 
untrustworth
d that: 
[T]he constitutional right guaranteed under § 7 of the Charter 
is not the right to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses 
in itself. The adversarial trial process, which includes cross-
examination, is but the means to achieve the end. Trial fair-
ness, as a princip
be achieved.166 
                                                                                                                      
161 See R. v. Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, para. 48; R. v. Lyttle, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, 
paras. 1–2. 
162 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193. This case involved review of a trial judge’s decision to curtail 
defense counsel’s right to cross-examine a Crown witness. The SCC found that the trial 
judge had placed too high a burden on the defense by requiring it to have “substantive 
evidence” of a defense theory upon which the Crown witness would be cross-examined. 
The SCC affirmed that only a “good faith basis” was required for a question put to a wit-
ness in cross-examination. See id. paras. 68–75. 
163 Id. paras. 1–2. 
164 See id. paras. 68–75. 
165 See [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787. 
166 Id. 
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 As all of the above cases make clear, under the Canadian Constitu-
tion there is no primary right for an accused to confront or cross-
examine witnesses, nor is there a clear explanation of the exact connec-
tion between cross-examination and the constitutional rights of an ac-
cused person.167 Cross-examination, however, has been held to be a 
vital part of the accused’s right to make a full answer and defense, 
which, in turn, is a principle of fundamental justice that must be re-
spected under section 7 of the Charter if there is potential for someone 
 b
al di-
mension” to the very simple rule that presumptively renders hearsay 
s to the hearsay 
le
                                                       
to e deprived of life, liberty, or security of the person.168 Cross-
examination is also an important means to ensure that an accused 
benefits from the ultimate right to a fair trial that is protected by sec-
tions 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.169 
 These indirect means of protecting a defendant’s ability to cross-
examine witnesses, in the context of a key hearsay law decision by the 
SCC, led the court to affirm that “the accused’s inability to test the evi-
dence may impact on the fairness of the trial, thereby giving the rule a 
constitutional dimension.”170 Notwithstanding this “constitution
inadmissible,171 there are nonetheless broad exception
ru  that must be discussed in order to understand fully the scope of 
any right to confront witnesses available to an accused in Canada. 
2. The Source and Content of Canadian Hearsay Law 
 In Canada, the contemporary hearsay exclusionary rule originates 
from the common law of evidence, rather than from any statute or con-
stitutional provision.172 In R. v. Evans, the SCC defined hearsay as “[a]n 
out-of-court statement which is admitted for the truth of its con-
tents.”173 The SCC subsequently refined this definition to explain that 
“[t]he essential defining features of hearsay are therefore the following: 
(1) the fact that the statement is adduced to prove the truth of its con-
tents and (2) the absence of a contemporaneous opportunity to cross-
                                                               
6–176. 
le, [2004] 1 S.C.R. para. 1–2. 
 been governed by a strict exclusionary rule 
rela . 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 16
168 See Lytt
169 See id. 
170 See Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. para. 3. 
171 See R. v. Mapara, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 358, para. 15. 
172 Cf. R. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, para. 153 (“The law of hearsay in Canada and 
throughout the common law world has long
xed by a complex array of exceptions.”)
173 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, 661. 
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examine the declarant.”174 In other words, under Canadian law, not 
every out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of its content is 
hearsay because the opportunity for the cross-examination of the decla-
rant at the time the statement is made will generally render the out-of-
ur
sti-
duce, through the victim’s mother, statements that the victim made to 
                                                                                                                     
co t statement admissible as something other than hearsay.175 As pre-
viously discussed, however, where a statement is caught by the hearsay 
definition, it is presumptively inadmissible176: “[A]bsent an exception, 
hearsay evidence is not admissible.”177 
 Historically, the common law in Canada recognized exceptions to 
the hearsay exclusionary rule for prior identifications,178 prior te
mony,179 admissions by co-conspirators against one another,180 dying 
declarations,181 and spontaneous statements,182 among others. Each ex-
ception is qualified, however, and includes one or more preconditions 
which must be satisfied before the hearsay statement is admissible.183 
 In addition to the historical exceptions to the hearsay exclusionary 
rule, Canadian common law, in R. v. Khan, recognized a residual excep-
tion for hearsay statements that were found to be both necessary and 
reliable.184 The Khan case involved charges filed against a doctor for 
sexual assault on a three-year-old child.185 The Crown sought to intro-
 
ionary rule. See Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. para. 
66;  
06] 2 S.C.R. para. 3. 
.A.) (surveying Canadian common law on the prior identification exception 
to h
ich spontaneous utterances may be admissible 
und
 
90] 2 S.C.R. 531, 548. 
174 Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. para. 35. 
175 See id. From the content of the hearsay definition, one might think that out-of-court 
statements that were made where an opportunity for cross-examination actually existed 
would be admissible, not as an “exception” to the hearsay rule, but simply as admissible 
evidence that does not amount to hearsay in the first place. This view, while logical, seems 
at odds with some SCC case law. See, e.g., R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, paras. 47–50. 
In Hawkins, the Crown had sought at trial to introduce previous testimony of a witness,who 
had been subject to cross-examination, in a subsequent proceeding. Id. para. 17. The SCC 
characterized this evidence in Hawkins, and later in Khelawon, as hearsay that could only be 
admitted under an exception to the exclus
Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. paras. 47–50.
176 Khelawon, [20
177 Id. para. 34. 
178 See Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. paras. 220–21; R. v. Tat, [1997] 35 O.R.3d 641, 654–64, 
(Can. Ont. C
earsay). 
179 R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, 544. 
180 R. v. Carter, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 938, 938. 
181 R. v. Aziga, [2006] OJ No 4545 (SCJ). 
182 See David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence 174–82 (5th ed. 
2008) (describing the various ways in wh
er Canadian common law). 
183 See sources cited supra notes 178–182.
184 R. v. Khan, [19
185 Id. at 533–34. 
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her mother approximately fifteen minutes after the alleged assault oc-
curred, namely that the doctor had put his penis in the child’s 
mouth.186 The trial judge, however, ruled that the hearsay statements 
were inadmissible.187 The SCC held that the trial judge correctly ap-
plied the law as it existed at the time, but questioned “the extent to 
which, if at all, the strictures of the hearsay rule should be relaxed in 
the case of children’s testimony.”188 
 ter Ultimately, the SCC remanded the matter for a new trial af
unanimously concluding that: 
[H]earsay evidence of a child’s statement on crimes commit-
ted against the child should be received, provided that the 
guarantees of necessity and reliability are met, subject to such 
safeguards as the judge may consider necessary and subject 
always to considerations affecting the weight that should be 
accorded to such evidence.189 
The SCC elaborated on the concept of necessity, noting: 
Necessity for these purposes must be interpreted as “reasona-
bly necessary.” The inadmissibility of the child’s evidence 
might be one basis for a finding of necessity. But sound evi-
dence based on psychological assessments that testimony in 
court might be traumatic for the child or harm the child 
might also serve. There may be other examples of circum-
stances which could establish the requirement of necessity.190 
Furt the hermore, the SCC suggested that assessments of the reliability of 
evidence would be extremely contextual: 
Many considerations such as timing, demeanour, the person-
ality of the child, the intelligence and understanding of the 
child, and the absence of any reason to expect fabrication in 
the statement may be relevant on the issue of reliability. I 
would not wish to draw up a strict list of considerations for re-
liability, nor to suggest that certain categories of evidence (for 
example the evidence of young children on sexual encoun-
                                                                                                                      
186 Id. at 534, 539. 
187 Id. at 537. The child victim told her mother that the doctor had asked her if she 
wanted a candy; she said yes; the doctor told her to open her mouth, and then “put his 
birdie in [her] mouth, shook it and peed in [her] mouth . . . .” Id. at 534. 
188 See id. at 540. 
189 Id. at 548 (emphasis added). 
190 Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 546 (emphasis added). 
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ters) should be always regarded as reliable. The matters rele-
vant to reliability will vary with the child and with the circum-
stances, and are best left to the trial judge.191 
The SCC subsequently heralded the Khan decision “as the triumph of a 
principled analysis over a set of ossified judicially created categories.”192 
The new principled analysis to hearsay exceptions created in Khan was 
further developed in subsequent cases, including R. v. Starr,193 R. v. 
M ara,ap 194 and Khelawon.195 
 Starr was the first case following Khan wherein the SCC considered 
how the traditional exceptions to the hearsay exclusionary rule and the 
new principled approach should operate in tandem.196 The facts of the 
case are somewhat complicated, but can be summarized as follows. 
Robert Starr was acquainted with Bernard Cook and Darlene We-
selowski, and was drinking with them on the night they were both shot 
to death. At some point after Starr left Cook and Weselowski, the two 
encountered Jodie Giesbrecht, Cook’s girlfriend. Cook told Giesbrecht 
that he could not stay with her, as he had to perpetrate an “Autopac 
scam” (an automobile insurance fraud) with Starr later in the night. 
After leaving Giesbrecht, both Cook and Weselowski were later found 
dead by the side of a road, each shot in the head.197 At trial, the Crown 
successfully introduced, through Giesbrecht, Cook’s statement that he 
intended to do an “Autopac scam” with Starr later in the night under 
the rubric of the “present intentions” traditional exception to the hear-
say exclusionary rule.198 A jury convicted Starr of two counts of first 
d ee murder.egr 199 
 On appeal to the SCC, where there was some indication that the 
reliability of Cook’s statement to Giesbrecht was in question,200 the SCC 
considered whether a traditional hearsay exception, present intentions, 
could operate to admit evidence even if one of the new principled cri-
                                                                                                                      
30. 
ras. 12–16. 
aras. 42–45. 
191 Id. at 547. 
192 R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, 9
193 See [2000] 2 S.C.R. para. 155. 
194 See [2005] 1 S.C.R. pa
195 See [2006] 2 S.C.R. p
196 See Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. paras. 220--21. 
197 See id. paras. 108–17. 
198 Id. paras. 111, 176. 
199 Id. para. 19 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting). 
200 Id. paras. 178–79 (majority opinion). 
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teria of necessity and reliability was not met.201 Prior to Starr, the SCC’s 
“application of the principled approach to hearsay admissibility in prac-
tice [had] involved only expanding the scope of hearsay admissibility 
beyond the traditional exceptions.”202 The SCC majority in Starr agreed 
that necessity and reliability needed to be the dominant concerns of 
any court considering the admission of a hearsay statement, since “[i]t 
would compromise trial fairness, and raise the spectre of wrongful con-
victions, if the Crown is allowed to introduce unreliable hearsay against 
the accused, regardless of whether it happens to fall within an existing 
exception.”203 The majority, however, also explained that the existing 
categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule served useful functions by 
providing participants in the trial process with “certainty, efficiency, and 
guidance.”204 Thus, Starr demonstrates the primacy of the principled 
approach over the categorical exception approach to hearsay law in 
Can
g that the evidence should never-
ada: 
 In some rare cases, it may also be possible under the par-
ticular circumstances of a case for evidence clearly falling 
within an otherwise valid exception nonetheless not to meet 
the principled approach’s requirements of necessity and reli-
ability. In such a case, the evidence would have to be ex-
cluded. However, I wish to emphasize that these cases will no 
doubt be unusual, and that the party challenging the admissi-
bility of evidence falling within a traditional exception will 
bear the burden of showin
theless be inadmissible.205 
Ultimately, the SCC held that Cook’s statement to Giesbrecht was not 
admissible under either the “present intentions” traditional exception 
or the principled approach because it was made under circumstances 
o spicion, and therefore did not possess threshold reliability.f su 206 
 The other important holding in Starr concerned the inquiry into 
threshold reliability, which was to be performed by a judge on a voir 
dire, required to determine whether a hearsay statement should be ad-
                                                                                                                      
201 On the facts of the Starr case, the “necessity” criterion was clearly met, since Cook 
was dead. Thus, the SCC was really concerned with assessing the status of traditional ex-
cep riterion was not satisfied. See id. paras. 108–17. 
 S.C.R. para. 192. 
09. 
tions in cases where the “reliability” c
202 Starr, [2000] 2
203 Id. para. 200. 
204 Id. para. 207. 
205 Id. para. 214. 
206 See id. paras. 208–
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missible under the principled approach.207 On this point, the Starr ma-
jority distinguished between threshold reliability and ultimate reliabil-
ity: “Threshold reliability is concerned not with whether the statement 
is true or not; that is a question of ultimate reliability. Instead, it is con-
cerned with whether or not the circumstances surrounding the state-
ment itself provide circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”208 
The distinction is significant because the different reliability assess-
ments are performed by different entities—a trial judge determines 
threshold reliability, and if it exists, then the hearsay statement is 
“passed on to be considered by the trier of fact.”209 The SCC, however, 
cautioned that “a court must not invade the province of the trier of fact 
and condition admissibility of hearsay on whether the evidence is ulti-
mately reliable.”210 In Starr, the majority also suggested that the trial 
judge should only look at factors surrounding the circumstances in 
which the hearsay statement was made when assessing threshold reli-
ability, and not at other evidence, such as “the declarant’s general repu-
tation for truthfulness, nor any prior or subsequent statements, consis-
nt
roblematic, and was subsequently overruled in Khela-
won.
 an-
ada 
termine 
cumstances of the case. 
                                                                                                                     
te  or not.”211 This restriction on the focus of the reliability inquiry 
proved to be p
212 
Mapara adequately summarizes the law relating to hearsay in C
after Starr: 
(a) Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless it 
falls under an exception to the hearsay rule. The traditional 
exceptions to the hearsay rule remain presumptively in place. 
(b) A hearsay exception can be challenged to de
whether it is supported by indicia of necessity and reliability, 
required by the principled approach. The exception can be 
modified as necessary to bring it into compliance. 
(c) In “rare cases”, evidence falling within an existing excep-
tion may be excluded because the indicia of necessity and re-
liability are lacking in the particular cir
 
.R. para. 215. 
6. 
. 217. 
207 See id. para. 214. 
208 Starr, [2000] 2 S.C
209 See id. para. 21
210 Id. para
211 See id. 
212 [2006] 2 S.C.R. para. 4. 
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(d) If hearsay evidence does not fall under a hearsay excep-
tion, it may still be admitted if indicia of reliability and neces-
sity are established on a voir dire.213 
 MIn apara, the SCC applied this framework to the R. v. Carter214 co-
conspirator hearsay exception, and held that the facts of Mapara met 
the traditional exception criteria from Carter.215 Further, the SCC held 
that the co-conspirators exception remained valid because the hearsay 
in question was both necessary and reliable, as required by the princi-
pled approach.216 
 Finally, as previously noted, in Khelawon, the SCC revisited the 
question of what evidence should be considered by a trial judge when 
assessing threshold reliability under the principled approach.217 The 
case involved accusations of assault and abuse filed against Ramnarine 
Khelawon, the manager of a retirement home, by five its senior resi-
dents.218 By the time of the trial, however, four of the five complainants 
were deceased, and the fifth was no longer competent to testify.219 
Thus, under the principled approach to hearsay, the Crown sought to 
introduce videotaped statements the complainants had provided to the 
police because, as the Crown argued, the videos were reliable and nec-
essary.220 The trial judge admitted all the videos after a voir dire to de-
termine threshold reliability, but ultimately found only two of the vid-
eos reliable enough to support a conviction.221 Khelawon was convicted 
of various charges related to two of the five complainants.222 A unani-
mous SCC unequivocally overturned the Starr decision, which held that 
only circumstances surrounding the making of a hearsay statement 
should be considered when assessing threshold reliability.223 Rather, the 
SCC directed courts to adopt a more “functional approach”224 that con-
siders all of the relevant evidence, including any corroborating evi-
dence.225 After considering all of this evidence in Khelawon, the SCC 
                                                                                                                      
R. para. 15. 
ara, [2005] 1 S.C.R. para. 31. 
 S.C.R. para. 3. 
ara. 5. 
–28. 
51–54; Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. para. 215. 
 S.C.R. para. 93. 
213 Mapara, [2005] 1 S.C.
214 [1982] 1 S.C.R. 938. 
215 See Map
216 See id. 
217 See [2006] 2
218 Id. p
219 Id. 
220 Id. para. 9. 
221 Id. paras. 27
222 Id. para. 5. 
223 See Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. paras. 
224 Khelawen, [2006] 2
225 Id. paras. 94–100. 
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af med that the trial judge erred in admitting the videotaped state-
ments of the complainants because there were significant indicators of 
their unreliability; for example, among other concerns, the statements 
were not under oath, one of the declarants was barely comprehensible, 
and one of the declarants’ mental capacity was an issue.
fir
eserve the integrity 
that circumstantial evidence of an 
bse
                                                                                                                     
226 
 The core of Canadian hearsay law has not changed significantly 
since Khelawon, and the Khan/Starr framework has been applied in a 
number of cases. For instance, in R. v. Couture, the SCC held that the 
principled approach to hearsay must be interpreted in a manner that 
preserves and reinforces the traditional rules of evidence.227 In that 
case, the SCC determined that hearsay should have been excluded, 
even if it was necessary and reliable, in order to pr
of the rule of spousal incompetence to testify.228 In R. v. Devine, the SCC 
deemed admissible a videotaped statement by a witness who recanted 
the statement at trial because the dual criteria of reliability and neces-
sity were satisfied by the circumstances in which the statement was ob-
tained and the witness’s recantation, respectively.229 
 Lastly, in R. v. Blackman, the SCC engaged in a fairly straightfor-
ward application of the principled approach to determine that a mur-
der victim’s statements to his mother some time before his death 
should be admissible through the mother where they were necessary 
and reliable.230 The SCC further commented on the importance of dis-
tinguishing between an absence of evidence of motive to lie and evi-
dence of an absence of motivation to lie; the former should be viewed 
as a neutral factor, while the latter may signal increased threshold reli-
ability.231 In Blackman, the SCC held 
a nce of motive to lie supported a ruling in favor of admission under 
the principled approach.232 The SCC emphasized, again, that: “The 
admissibility voir dire must remain focused on the hearsay evidence in 
question. It is not intended, and cannot be allowed by trial judges, to 
become a full trial on the merits.”233 
 To summarize, Canadian hearsay law occupies a space that is close 
to constitutional law. Although the rule against hearsay has constitu-
 
517, para. 55. 
2 S.C.R. 298, paras. 34, 44. 
–38. 
226 See id. paras. 107–109. 
227 [2007] 2 S.C.R. 
228 See id. para. 63. 
229 See [2008] 2 S.C.R. 283, para. 25. 
230 See R. v. Blackman, [2008] 
231 See id. para. 35. 
232 See id. paras. 33
233 Id. para. 57. 
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tional dimensions, and cross-examination plays a central role in pro-
tecting an accused’s rights to a fair trial and to make a full answer and 
defense, there is no absolute right to cross-examine all witnesses.234 
Hearsay is presumptively inadmissible, but exceptions to this rule exist 
for traditional categories of evidence and for any other evidence that is 
both necessary and reliable.235 The latest development in Canadian 
hearsay law purports to provide a “principled approach” to the applica-
tion of hearsay exceptions and is being applied fairly consistently by the 
courts.236 Recent cautions by the SCC to trial courts emphasizing that 
they not u mate reli-
ilit
ts to rely upon a “principled ap-
roa
le because relevant evidence 
will im-
pose st in 
theo ar-
say r on 
epist
                                                                                                                     
surp a trier of fact’s responsibility to determine ulti
ab y, however, signal that the law may be moving toward less rigorous 
scrutiny of the threshold reliability of hearsay statements, and conse-
quently toward a more relaxed application of the exclusionary rule. 
B. Critiquing the Coherence of Canadian Hearsay Law 
 Canadian hearsay law purpor
p ch” to the identification of exceptions to the presumptive exclu-
sionary rule.237 In many ways, the framework established by the SCC in 
Khan and subsequent decisions is in fact principled. In some essential 
ways, however, the doctrine is contradictory and unprincipled, which 
renders it vulnerable to criticism. 
 The two principles underlying the Canadian approach to hearsay 
law are necessity and reliability.238 Necessity explains the need for an 
exception to the hearsay exclusionary ru
be unavailable to a court without the exception.239 Reliability 
s a safeguard upon potential evidence, thereby ensuring, at lea
ry, that fact-finders are not led astray by the evidence.240 The he
ule and its exceptions are virtually always justified in Canada 
emic, or truth-maximizing, grounds: 
 
234 See Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. para. 48. 
235 See id. para. 34; Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 548. 
236 See Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. para. 42; Mapara, [2005] 1 S.C.R. para 15; Starr, 
[2000] 2 S.C.R. para. 214. 
237 Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. para. 42; Mapara, [2005] 1 S.C.R. para 15; Starr, [2000] 2 
S.C.R. para. 214; see Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 540. 
238 See Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 546. 
239 Cf. id. at 542 (“Necessity was present, other evidence of the event . . . being inad-
missible.”). 
240 See id. at 547 (“Many considerations such as timing, demeanour, the personality of 
the child, the intelligence and understanding of the child, and the absence of any reason 
to expect fabrication in the statement may be relevant on the issue of reliability.”). 
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[T]he rule against hearsay is intended to enhance the accu-
racy of the court’s findings of fact, not impede its truth-
e admission of evi-
dence that cannot be cross-examined, and the numerous exceptions to 
s-
examined) When Canadian hearsay law is probed in even the most cur-
ry
ot 
pp
                                                                                                                     
seeking function. . . . [However, i]n some circumstances, the 
evidence presents minimal dangers and its exclusion, rather 
than its admission, would impede accurate fact finding. 
Hence, over time a number of exceptions to the rule were 
created by the courts.241 
Thus, one might argue on a broad level that hearsay law in Canada is 
principled because it seeks to ensure that factually accurate verdicts are 
produced, or that truth is found within a trial to the greatest extent 
possible. 
 Based on these principles of necessity and reliability, and the epis-
temic goals that they purport to serve, one must ask two important ques-
tions: 1) Is cross-examination actually the best way to produce reliable, 
and therefore more truthful, evidence?; and 2) If so, how can Canadian 
courts justify both the hearsay rule, which prevents th
the hearsay rule, which admit evidence even though it cannot be cros
so  fashion in order to answer these questions, it is evident that the law 
is littered with incoherence and flawed justifications. 
1. Questioning the SCC’s Dogmatic Acceptance of the Value of Cross-
Examination 
 To answer the first question, it is instructive to look at explanations 
that the SCC has provided for why it places such a high value on cross-
examination. In R. v. Osolin, for example, the SCC held that the impor-
tance of cross-examination “cannot be denied,” stating that “[i]t is the 
ultimate means of demonstrating truth and of testing veracity. . . . This 
is an old and well established principle.”242 Similarly, in Lyttle, the SCC 
claimed that, but for cross-examination, there was sometimes “no other 
way to expose falsehood, to rectify error, to correct distortion or to 
elicit vital information that would otherwise remain forever con-
cealed.”243 It is telling, however, that these assertions by the SCC are n
su orted by empirical evidence, or even rational explanations about 
why cross-examination has such truth-maximizing tendencies.244 In-
 
241 Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. para. 2. 
242 See [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, 663 (Cory, J., concurring). 
243 See [2004] 1 S.C.R. para. 1. 
244 Cf. cases cited supra notes 242–243. 
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stead, the SCC appears willing to simply accept, perhaps as common 
sense or as a form of “wisdom of the ages,” that cross-examination actu-
ally serves to elicit truth from, and expose the untruth of, witnesses. 
 As any epistemologist, or even an ordinary skeptic, will note, this 
substantiation of the value of cross-examination is extremely flimsy. It 
may be that the SCC is correct in its assumptions about cross-
examination—but this would be an epistemic coincidence rather than 
the result of any careful consideration of the evidence in support of, or 
in contrast to, the theory that cross-examination produces truth, be-
cause no such evidence appears to ever have been canvassed by the SCC, 
or by courts in Canada more generally. My point at this stage is not to 
ing truth. Basically, if it can be demonstrated that cross-examination 
earsay 
ca inated from Canadian law—which is why it is fascinat-
reasoning of the SCC that allows courts in Canada to admit or exclude 
     
argue that the SCC is wrong about the value of cross-examination, but 
simply that the SCC’s theory about the value of cross-examination was 
not derived in an epistemologically, or logically, valid manner. The the-
ory was assumed true, and has been accepted as such ever since the ini-
tial assumption was made. 
 Thus, if one begins to question whether cross-examination is actu-
ally the best tool, or even a useful tool, for eliciting truthful evidence, yet 
one clings to the idea that evidence law should incorporate principles 
that maximize a court’s ability to determine truth, then the coherence 
of Canadian hearsay law is seriously undermined. To begin with, the 
very definition of hearsay would likely need to change because it pre-
sumes a certain evidentiary weakness in out-of-court statements where 
there is no opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination.245 Fur-
thermore, there may not be a need for a strong exclusionary rule at all 
if such a rule only serves to protect opportunities for cross-examination, 
and cross-examination cannot convincingly be said to assist in produc-
does not assist in generating the truth at trial, the very idea of h
n largely be elim
ing that the SCC never attempted to demonstrate exactly how and why 
cross-examination produces greater probabilities of arriving at the truth. 
2. A Legal Paradox: Cross-Examination as Both Dispensable and 
Indispensable? 
 Even if one accepts that cross-examination tends to assist in elicit-
ing the truth from witnesses, there is still an unavoidable flaw in the 
                                                                                                                 
245 See supra text accompanying notes 172–191 (discussing the development of the rela-
tion  in Canadian jurisprudence). ship of hearsay and cross-examination
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hearsay evidence depending on threshold reliability. Recall that, under 
the principled approach to identifying exceptions to the hearsay exclu-
sionary rule in Khan, evidence can be admitted if it is necessary and 
reliable.246 Thus, a trial judge is forced to rule on the threshold reliabil-
ity of a statement before it can be passed to a trier of fact, whether 
judge or jury, to assess ultimate reliability.247 Recall also that the trial 
dg
  to 
test, in-
stanc say 
state
ed 
Crawford v. Washington when he observed that “[d]ispensing with con-
                                                                                                                     
ju e is denied the benefit of the “ultimate means” of testing the reli-
ability of the evidence—the tool of cross-examination that can often be 
the only way to properly probe the reliability of the evidence—in mak-
ing her assessment of threshold reliability.248 
The trial judge is therefore forced to assume, without being able
that evidence is reliable in certain circumstances.249 Thus, for 
e, the SCC concluded in Khan that the child victim’s hear
ments to her mother were reliable because: 
The child had no motive to falsify her story, which emerg
naturally and without prompting. Moreover, the fact that she 
could not be expected to have knowledge of such sexual acts 
imbues her statement with its own peculiar stamp of reliability. 
Finally, her statement was corroborated by real evidence.250 
This reasoning by the SCC leads to obvious questions. How does one 
know that the child had no motive to lie if the child cannot be ques-
tioned (perhaps the child was angry with the doctor for having admin-
istered a painful needle)? Would it not be preferable, from an epis-
temic perspective, to ascertain through cross-examination the child’s 
actual knowledge of sexual acts before accepting her statement, rather 
than inferring a lack of knowledge, and using that inference to suggest 
that the child’s statement was reliable? As these questions suggest, the 
SCC’s reasoning in Khan is problematic because it assumed a statement 
to be reliable so that it could dispense with the need to actually estab-
lish the reliability of a statement through cross-examination while at the 
same time noting that cross-examination is sometimes, by the SCC’s 
own admission, the only way to uncover the truth of a matter.251 It is a 
perfect example of the reasoning flaw acknowledged by Justice Scalia in 
 
0] 2 S.C.R. 546–47. 
990] 2 S.C.R. at 547. 
 548; see also Lyttle, [2004] 1 S.C.R. para. 1. 
246 See Khan, [199
247 See id. at 547. 
248 See Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 663. 
249 See Khan, [1
250 Id. at 548. 
251 See Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at
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frontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing 
with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”252 In both Khan 
and Justice Scalia’s example, the reasoning is tantamount to cheating 
the system by circumventing a process that is believed to produce the 
most truthful results in criminal trials. 
 Perhaps the only way to understand why the SCC accepts this faulty 
reasoning is to appreciate that the SCC may actually hold dissonant be-
liefs about cross-examination. As the principled approach suggests by 
its very design, cross-examination is not, in fact, the best way to test the 
veracity of a statement, because it is almost unthinkable that courts 
would allow accused persons to be convicted on the basis of statements 
exposed to anything less than the most rigorous scrutiny.253 Instead, 
perhaps the SCC believes, at least implicitly, that there are other equally 
effective ways to test the reliability of evidence, and that evidence 
should be admissible when it has been exposed to these equally effec-
tive substitutes for cross-examination. If this hypothesis is true, then it 
further demonstrates the internal incoherence in current Canadian 
h say doctrine, because cross-examination cannot logically and si-ear
multaneously be both “the best” and “not the best” means for testing 
evidence. 
 As the above critique of Canadian hearsay law makes apparent, the 
law is incoherent not because it lacks guiding principles, but because its 
content cannot be justified in terms of the principles of necessity and 
reliability that it purports to respect.254 If hearsay law were truly about 
the admission of only necessary and reliable evidence, then it would be 
hard to criticize the law as being unprincipled. In reality, however, there 
is no clear indication that the doctrine developed by the SCC in Khan, 
Starr, and Khelawon actually encourages the admission of such evidence. 
The basic belief in the tendency of cross-examination to produce truth-
ful testimony is both unproven and uncritically accepted by the SCC, 
but it remains a foundational tenet of current hearsay law. Further-
more, the supposedly principled approach to exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule is itself unprincipled as a result of the flaws in reasoning 
that are incorporated into the threshold reliability assessment man-
dat ke ed by the approach. For these reasons, Canadian hearsay law, li
American confrontation law, lacks principle. 
                                                                                                                      
252 See 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
253 See Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 546–47. 
254 See supra text accompanying notes 237–251. 
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III. Considering Confrontation Law from First Principles 
 Instead of considering confrontation and hearsay law from the 
perspective of o the Anglo- one who is indoctrinated or locked int
American lega  of law afresh l tradition, it is useful to consider this body
and to ponder its model content in a way that can be justified through 
reference to acceptable legal principles. 
A. Identifying Relevant Principles: A First Step 
 It is generally accepted that one objective of the rules of evidence 
applicable at criminal trials, and perhaps the most important objective, 
is the promotion of the ability of fact-finders to arrive at accurate, or 
truthful, conclusions and verdicts.255 I will refer to this as the “epis-
temic” objective of evidence law. That criminal evidence law should fur-
ther this epistemic objective is not a new proposition: Over sixty years 
ago, Edmund Morgan noted that a trial must, among other things, lead 
to “as close an approximation of the truth as is possible in the circum-
stances in which the court has to function.”256 Of course, as any ama-
teur epistemologist257 would likely point out, even if an objective 
“Truth” exists, it is unlikely that a fallible human trier of fact will be ca-
p e of realizing this “Truth.”  Consequently, a realistic body of evi-abl 258
dence law will not strive to produce objective “Truth,” because this is 
probably unattainable, but should nonetheless consist of rules that tend 
to assist triers of fact in finding something that approaches, as closely as 
humanly possible, this objective “Truth.” 
 There can be little argument that promotion of a fact-finder’s abil-
ity to determine truth is a valid and important principle of criminal 
                                                                                                                      
255 See, e.g., Larry Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal 
Epistemology 2 (2006) (“[W]hatever else it is, a criminal trial is first and foremost an 
epistemic engine, a tool for ferreting out the truth from what will often initially be a con-
fusing array of clues and indicators.”); see also Paciocco & Steusser, supra note 182, at 2 
(“As a matter of principle, the rules of evidence should accommodate the presentation 
and consideration of any information that could help the trier of fact to come to an accu-
rate factual determination.”); Michael S. Pardo, The Field of Evidence and the Field of Knowl-
edge
ngers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 
Har
ion that both experience and philosophy of 
ind
, 24 L. & Phil. 321, 321 (2005) (“The trial is fundamentally an epistemological event. 
We want jurors and judges to know.”). 
256 Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Da
v. L. Rev. 177, 184–85 (1948). 
257 I include myself in this category. 
258 See Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law 2 (2005) (“Because absolute cer-
tainties are presently unavailable—a proposit
uction confirm—adjudicative fact-finding, as, indeed, any fact-finding, is bound to be 
conducted in conditions of uncertainty.”). 
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evidence law; after all, a basic purpose of criminal law itself is to deter, 
punish, and rehabilitate those who commit crimes,259 and it would be 
nonsensical for such a system to operate arbitrarily against those who 
did not “truly” commit crimes. As the preceding statement implies, 
however, truth is important not only for the criminal law to convict and 
punish those guilty of crimes, but is equally important, if not more so, 
in order to ensure that the materially260 innocent are not convicted of 
crimes.261 Philosophers and theorists generally agree that it is prefer-
able for several guilty persons to escape justice than for one innocent 
person to be punished by the criminal law.262 Although there is no con-
sensus on the ratio of false acquittals to false convictions that would be 
acceptable in a liberal and democratic society,263 it is obvious that a 
tr -seeking trial is an essential means to ensure that the number of uth
false convictions within a criminal justice system does not exceed mor-
ally and socially allowable limits.264 
 If we accept that a criminal trial is largely about determining the 
truth of a matter, then how should evidence law function in order to 
assis uld t this larger goal? The simple answer is that evidence law sho
ensu the re that all relevant evidence is admitted for consideration by 
trier
epistemic grounds 
in ally all forms of sophisticated hypothesis evaluation 
           
 of fact: 
One of the important and legitimate gate-keeping functions 
of a judge is to see to it that the jury hears all and only rele-
vant evidence. If American judges stuck resolutely to this 
principle, they could not be faulted on 
s ce virtu
(in science, medicine, and technology, for instance) work 
with this same notion of relevance. 
                                                                                                           
25 ses 
and objectives in the context of criminal sentencing law). 
9 See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 718 (Can.) (articulating these purpo
260 See Laudan, supra note 255, at 12. I use the word “materially” here, and throughout 
this Article, as Laudan uses it in his book—namely to distinguish between a factual result 
of a trial (guilty or not guilty), and the objectively true state of affairs that a trial seeks to 
ascertain. Id. In other words, one can be “factually” guilty of a crime in any case where a 
court makes a finding of guilt, but this does not necessarily mean that the offender is “ma-
terially” guilty, since the relevant fact-finder could have been wrong: the offender may not 
have truly committed the crime. Id. 
261 See id. at 1–2. 
262 See, e.g., id. at 1, 63. 
263 See id. at 63–64 (sampling the various ratios of false acquittals to false convictions, 
ranging from 2:1 to 1000:1, that various thinkers have proffered as acceptable over the 
ages). 
264 Id. 
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 . . . . 
 It is universally agreed, outside the law courts, that deci-
sion makers can make the best and most informed decisions 
only if they are made aware of as much relevant evidence as 
possible. Excluding relevant but non-redundant evidence, 
for whatever reasons, decreases the likelihood that rational 
decision makers will reach a correct conclusion.265 
In other words, a principled body of evidence law concerned only with 
determining the truth of a matter would have but a single rule: All 
relevant, non-redundant evidence is admissible.266 No evidence would 
be excluded on any other grounds. 
 It is probably not enough, however, for evidence law simply to 
maximize a fact-finder’s ability to arrive at truth in her conclusions, 
since there are, and should be, non-epistemic policy considerations that 
inform the law of evidence.267 In my view, the main non-epistemic value 
that should govern evidence law is fairness. For instance, even if we as-
sumed that truthful and accurate confessions could be obtained 
through torture, it seems clear that a rule of evidence should nonethe-
less prevent a fact-finder from relying on such confessions because in 
liberal democratic societies (and most civilized societies of any kind), 
w bhor the very idea of torture.268 It would simply be unfair for the e a
State to use a confession extracted through torture when society has 
unequivocally asserted that it does not condone torture. As this exam-
ple demonstrates, the measures that can legitimately be authorized to 
further the search for truth within a trial are not unlimited. 
  ad-The notion that laws of criminal evidence must be fair, and, in
ditio ust n to assisting a court to arrive at a factually correct verdict, m
also rn 
                                                                                                                     
permit deliberation that shows appropriate “respect and conce
 
265 Id. at 18–19. 
266 See Laudan, supra note 253, at 18–19. This claim is not universally accepted. For in-
stance, Stein argues that the “ostensibly appealing proposition” that more information 
yields better adjudicative accuracy is wrong, because “[t]here is no quantitative parallel 
between complete and incomplete information.” Stein, supra note 258, at 122. While I 
note Stein’s criticism, I maintain that, other things being equal, more information is better 
than less information when finding facts. See Laudan, supra note 255, at 18–19. 
267 Stein, supra note 258, at 12 (“Generally, when the epistemological reasons for fact-
finding no longer apply, adjudicators allocate the risk of error by applying the rules and 
the principles from the moral domain of evidence law. Morality picks up what the epistemology 
leaves off.”). 
268 See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (aspiring to prevent torture 
around the world). 
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for t ck he person whose case is being judged,” is a central theme of Ho
Lai H
 be understood to impose ethical demands on the 
ct 
o’s treatise on the philosophy of evidence law: 
A party has not merely a right that the substantive law be cor-
rectly applied to objectively true findings of fact, and a right 
to procedure that is rationally structured to determine the 
truth; she has, more broadly, a right to a just verdict, where 
justice must
manner in which the court conducts the trial, and impor-
tantly, on how it deliberates on the verdict. Findings of fa
must be reached by a form of inquiry and process of reason-
ing that are not only epistemically sound but also morally de-
fensible.269 
Thus, at least according to Ho, rules of evidence should encourage the 
conduct of both morally fair and epistemically effective trials.270 
 Other commentators make similar arguments using slight variances 
in terminology. For instance, Toni Massaro suggests that where a rule of 
evidence “jars some persons’ sense of fairness,” the rule should be rein-
terpreted in a manner that “corresponds with common notions of fair-
ness to the accused,” specifically in a way that “rests on principles of 
human dignity.”271 Seizing on this concept of dignity, Ian Dennis recog-
nizes that, in order to respect “the defendant’s dignity and autonomy,” a 
rule of evidence should “symbolically place[ the accused] on a footing 
of equality with the witness.”272 This, according to Dennis, “emphasises 
is eh ntitlement to play a full role in the adjudicative process rather than 
being dealt with as an object for the application of the criminal law.”273 
Finally, Eileen Scallen argues that a rule of evidence should have, in ad-
dition to an evidentiary and a procedural dimension, a “societal” di-
mension that “embodies communal values,” which would presumably 
include a value of fairness.274 
 Regardless of whether one labels an underlying objective of evi-
dence law as the promotion of dignity, communal values, equality, or 
appropriate respect and concern for the accused, I argue that, on a 
                                                                                                                      
269 Hock Lai Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for 
Truth 79 (2008). 
270 See id. 
271 See Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 
863, 866 (1988). 
272 See Dennis, supra note 1, at 263–64. 
273 See id. at 264. 
274 See Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-
Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 623, 626–27, 641–43 (1992). 
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b d level, the discussion centers upon a single concept of fairness. In 
each of the above passages, commentators express a desire to see rules 
of evidence shaped in a way that accords with common understandings 
of fairness. 
 While it is true that the ideals of truth and fairness inform the law 
of evidence, these two ideals should not necessarily have equal impact 
upon the law, especially if there is tension between them. In most cases, 
no such tension will exist because an epistemically sound trial will also 
be a fair trial; that is to say, an accused who is materially innocent has a 
particularly high interest in a factually correct verdict because it would 
be unfa
roa
ir to convict him for a crime that he did not commit,275 while a 
ate
ect and con-
rn
prevent and punish crimes),277 then one can see how epistemic and 
fairness concerns will tend to converge in almost all cases. 
m rially guilty accused may not have a particularly strong interest in 
seeing the truth emerge at his trial, but he certainly could not com-
plain, under most circumstances, that a factually correct verdict is un-
fair.276 
 In this sense, truth and fairness overlap substantially. I appreciate 
that there is potential for conflict between these ideals—such as a reli-
able torture confession, if such a confession even existed—but the 
magnitude of this potential for conflict depends on how broadly one 
construes the concept of fairness in the context of a criminal trial. If 
one views fairness as being a value that applies only to an accused, then 
there may be sizable scope for tension between truth and fairness; 
however, if one understands fairness as being applicable to an accused 
(who should be treated with appropriate respect and concern), to wit-
nesses (who should also be treated with appropriate resp
ce ), and to society as a whole (since the greater community’s claim to 
fairness might demand that effective measures be taken by the State to 
                                                                                                                      
277 ing). 
This b ed by 
the SC
275 See Laudan, supra note 255, at 144 (“[I]t cannot be hostile to the innocent defen-
dant  propo e that the r to s ules governing a trial should be those most likely to lead to a 
true verdict. Above all else, the innocent defendant seeks a true verdict.”). 
276 Cf. id. at 145 (stating that evidentiary practice generally tends to, if anything, over-
acquit guilty defendants). 
 See, e.g., R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, 587 (Can.) (McLachlin, J., concurr
roader conception of fairness is a reasonable one, I think, and has been espous
C on several occasions. For example, the Court has stated: 
At base, a fair trial is a trial that appears fair, both from the perspective of the 
accused and the perspective of the community. A fair trial must not be con-
fused with the most advantageous trial possible from the accused’s point of 
view. Nor must it be conflated with the perfect trial; in the real world, perfec-
 
2012] Improving Canadian and American Law on Hearsay and Confrontation 439 
 Thus, since the value of truth in shaping rules of evidence almost 
always subsumes, rather than overrides, the value of fairness, it stands 
to reason that evidence law should be driven, first and foremost, by 
epistemic concerns. To be sure, the value of truth will, in certain cases, 
need to be sacrificed in order to advance some non-epistemic, fairness-
related goals; however, this “dominant value” substitution should occur 
only in the exceptional cases where truth and fairness ideals diverge, 
and lawmakers, whether judicial or legislative, should be clear about 
e 
clusively on generating epistemically accurate results, with only limited 
exceptions
th deliberate purpose and effect of any evidence rule that subordi-
nates epistemic concerns to fairness concerns in these rare cases. 
 Notwithstanding the above analysis, some Anglo-American legal 
commentators suggest that many rules of evidence, and most exclusion-
ary rules of evidence, are actually not epistemically sound, and that the 
law of evidence is disproportionately influenced by misplaced fairness 
concerns.278 Perhaps this emphasis on fairness at the expense of truth 
flows from an overly restrictive understanding on the part of lawmakers 
that trial fairness is a concept that only pertains to an accused. In any 
event, as I will explain below, Canadian hearsay rules and American con-
frontation law might look remarkably different if they were focused ex-
 to account for independent trial fairness concerns. 
B. Applying the Ideals of Truth and Fairness to Hearsay  
and Confrontation Law 
 For the sake of argument, let us accept that criminal evidence law is 
primarily concerned with facilitating epistemically correct conclusions 
within trials, and that the law leaves some room, under exceptional cir-
cumstances, for the displacement of truth as an ultimate goal in favor of 
another fairness-related goal. This proposition would certainly allow for 
the development of principled rules of evidence, and particularly, of a 
                                                                                                                      
tion is seldom attained. A fair trial is one which satisfies the public interest in 
getting at the truth, while preserving basic procedural fairness to the accused. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
278 See, e.g., Laudan, supra note 255, at 10. Laudan states: 
Because current American jurisprudence tends to the view that rights almost 
invariably trump questions of finding out the truth (when those two concerns 
are in conflict), there has been far less discussion than is healthy about 
whether certain common legal practices—whether mandated by common law 
traditions or by the U.S. Constitution or devised as court-designed remedies 
for police abuses—are intrinsically truth thwarting. 
Id. at 6. 
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principled body of hearsay and confrontation law. Under this proposi-
ti , there is room to argue about whether the underlying principle is on
good or bad for the law, but no one can say that the law is unprincipled 
if it were justified by reference to predominantly epistemic concerns. 
1. Justifying Admission of Hearsay on Epistemic Grounds 
 Would relevant, non-redundant hearsay be presumptively excluded 
under such a principled form of evidence law? In order to answer this 
question, one must first know whether there is a valid epistemic reason 
for excluding such evidence. Historically, hearsay was considered a dan-
ger because it was presented to juries without an opportunity for the 
trier of fact to see a party testing the declarant’s perception, memory, 
sincerity, and communication skills under cross-examination, which, in 
turn, might cause the trier of fact to place undue weight on the hearsay 
evidence.279 The historically accepted dangers of hearsay, however, and 
the actual dangers of hearsay, if any, are not necessarily identical.280 In 
other words, if the exclusionary rule is to be justified on epistemic 
grounds, there needs to be some indication, preferably empirical, that 
admitting hearsay evidence leads triers of fact away from, rather than 
closer to, the truth—even though courts claim that rules of evidence 
such as the hearsay exclusionary rule “reflect considerable wisdom and 
judicial experience.”281 
 Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to canvass the full 
spectrum o s ffect of the hearsay exclusionary f studie  examining the e
rul  wealth of data and opinion tend-e on jurors,  there is certain282 ly a
ing dverse im- to suggest that hearsay evidence is not likely to have an a
pact on a fact-finder’s ability to reach accurate conclusions.283 Mock 
                                                                                                                      
279 See Morgan, supra note 256, at 179–88. 
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280 See Laudan, supra note 255, at 10. 
281 Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. para. 59; see Laudan, supra note 255, at 10. 
282 See Andrew L.T. Choo, Hearsay and Confrontation in Criminal Trials 33–37 
(1996); see also Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of 
the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 973 (2006) (noting that between 1991 and 
2006 some twenty-seven primary and secondary empirical studies have been undertaken to 
study juror use o
 See, e.g., Choo, supra note 282, at 42–43 (“We have seen that the extent to 
ation of demeanour and cross-examination can actually expose unreliability 
ncertain, and it is also questionable whether the oath discourages untruthfulne
tent to which it has been traditionally assumed to do.”); Park & Saks, supra note
 (“The circumstances of some studies revealed jurors to be quite capable of he
nting hearsay testimony as compared to firsthand witness testimony.”). Also, F
aintains: 
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jurors have rated the usefulness of a hearsay witness’s testimony as be-
ing less than that of an eyewitness,284 which tends to demonstrate that 
jurors are cognizant of the inherent weaknesses of hearsay evidence 
and that they will not put undue weight on such testimony. In fact, as 
one study found, jurors tend to assess the potential weaknesses of hear-
say evidence more carefully than they assess eyewitness testimony: 
[I]t is conceivable that jurors scrutinize hearsay testimony 
more rigorously than eyewitness testimony because they dis-
trust hearsay testimony inherently. The findings that jurors are 
insensitive to the quality of eyewitness testimony, yet are sensi-
tive to the relative accuracy of hearsay evidence, challenge the 
legal assumption that jurors can accurately judge the validity of 
eyewitness testimony but are incapable of judging the reliabil-
ity of hearsay testimony.285 
If these studies are to be believed, it is clear that the hearsay exclusion-
ary rule operates at cross-purposes with the general epistemic goal of 
criminal evidence law, because the rule requires relevant evidence to be 
excluded even though the perceived dangers of the testimony are fully 
understood and accounted for by the triers of fact.286 
 Even if the above studies, and other similar studies, do not provide 
conclusive proof that hearsay evidence is either a) helpful or b) not 
harmful to a jury, there is still no valid epistemic reason for excluding 
the evidence until we can say with an acceptable degree of certainty 
that hearsay evidence is harmful to a jury, or that it will tend to hinder a 
fact-finder in his efforts to arrive at the truth.287 If relevant hearsay evi-
dence is helpful, or not harmful, then it should be admissible based on 
                                                                                                                      
[T]here is no good basis for believing that as a presumptive matter the intro-
duction of hearsay evidence relevant to a material proposition will lead a jury 
away from rather than closer to the truth; on the contrary, it appears that the 
exclusionary rule, shutting the eyes and ears of the trier of fact to evidence 
that is often highly probative, impairs, slows, and adds unnecessary expense 
to the truth-determining process. 
Friedman, supra note 146, at 264. 
284 Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 
Minn. L. Rev. 703, 718 (1992). 
285 Id. at 720. 
286 Compare, supra notes 311–313 and accompanying text (summarizing studies that 
suggest jurors are generally skeptical of hearsay testimony), with Laudan, supra note 275, 
at 2 (“[W]hatever else it is, a criminal trial is first and foremost an epistemic engine, a tool 
for ferreting out the truth from what will often initially be a confusing array of clues and 
indicators.”). 
287 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 282–286. 
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the presumption that all relevant evidence should be admissible on 
epistemic grounds. If it is not clear whether hearsay evidence is helpful 
or harmful, then it should still be admissible on epistemic grounds 
based on the same presumption. If, and only if, we can be satisfied that 
hearsay evidence is harmful, however, it should be excluded on epis-
temic grounds because it will hamper the truth-seeking task of the trier 
of fact.288 
 Surveying the data regarding the usefulness of hearsay evidence, 
rather than the judicial rhetoric and dogma, it becomes clear that there 
is no empirical body of knowledge suggesting with acceptable certainty 
that hearsay evidence is harmful to a trier of fact.289 On the basis of em-
pirical observations, hearsay evidence might be helpful, neutral, or 
harmful to fact-finders. In light of this current state of knowledge, or 
lack of knowledge, about the true value of hearsay evidence, one cannot 
convincingly argue that hearsay evidence should be excluded from 
cr inal trials on epistemic grounds. Relevant, non-redundant hearsay im
evidence should always be admitted if truth is the ultimate and only goal 
of a trial. 
2. Justifying Admission of Hearsay on Fairness Grounds 
 If hearsay and confrontation law is to be principled, and if there is 
no valid epistemic basis for excluding hearsay, there must be some other 
non-epistemic, fairness-type reason for excluding such evidence. Recall 
that I previously accepted the possibility that truth sometimes must be 
sacrificed in a rule of evidence in order to advance another fairness ob-
jective, but that this should occur only in exceptional cases.290 I sug-
g d that such a reprioritization of evidentiary principles can occur in este
the case of reliable confessions that are extracted through torture, since 
fairness would demand that these be excluded.291 As I will explain, how-
ever, I cannot conceive of any fairness concern that would require the 
exclusion of relevant, non-redundant hearsay evidence. 
                                                                                                                      
288 See Laudan, supra note 255, at 215. Laudan makes a similar point regarding the 
Amer
ilable, our 
default assumption should be that relevant evidence is admissible. 
Id. 
74. 
8. 
ican exclusionary rule for retracted confessions: 
It would be premature to suggest that we have any robust evidence from well-
designed studies that would either corroborate or undermine the hypotheses 
that drive these evidentiary exclusions. Until such studies are ava
289 See supra text accompanying notes 282–286. 
290 See supra text accompanying notes 268–2
291 See supra text accompanying notes 26
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 Some commentators suggest that an accused must have a right to a 
face-to-face confrontation with witnesses in order for the accused’s dig-
nity to be respected.292 This type of theory generally argues that par-
ticipation—active participation—by a defendant in her trial is an essen-
tial element of a system that respects the dignity of the defendant.293 
The main flaw with this theory, however, is that it asserts a proposition 
that cannot be proven: How can we authoritatively say that procedure X 
is more respectful of a defendant’s dignity than procedure Y? Dignity is 
such an abstract concept that it is difficult to employ it effectively to 
argue for a concrete formulation of a rule of evidence.294 In the ab-
sence of any obvious indignity to an accused that would accompany the 
admission of a hearsay statement without opportunity for contempora-
neous confrontation or cross-examination, I find the suggestion that 
dignity demands the exclusion of such evidence to be utterly unpersua-
sive. 
 A similar criticism can be leveled against each of the aforemen-
tioned non-epistemic justifications for an exclusionary rule of evi-
dence.295 An accused is shown a full measure of respect and concern at 
his trial regardless of whether hearsay evidence is admitted, as long as 
the trier of fact does not callously overlook the inherent weaknesses of 
the evidence. This requirement of careful deliberation on the part of 
the fact-finder, however, applies with respect to every piece of evidence 
that comes before her, not just with respect of hearsay evidence. In 
other words, the requirement for a trier of fact to deliberate conscien-
tiously out of fairness to the accused is a requirement that demands 
that jurors be instructed about potential frailties in the evidence, but it 
is not a requirement that should lead to the exclusion of relevant, non-
                                                                                                                      
292 See Massaro, supra note 271, at 917. 
293 Id. at 902 (“[T]he procedure should allow those affected to participate meaning-
fully, por-
tance
e is whether the community in which criminal trials are conducted 
on of the accused is attractive in moral and political 
re-
sent cellent and humorous animated repre-
sent
personally, and on equal footing with their adversary.”). Stein also noted the im
 of participations: 
Arguably, a criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses 
and the consequent exclusion of hearsay statements should also be perceived 
as belonging to the family of participation rights that are valuable per se. . . . 
The issu
without full participati
terms. 
Stein, supra note 258, at 31. 
294 See The Simpsons: A Milhouse Divided (FOX television broadcast Dec. 1, 1996) (p
ing, from the fourth to the sixth minutes, an ex
ation of the difficulty one has when thinking about or attempting to draw dignity). 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 291–301. 
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r ndant evidence.edu 296 It simply strains logic to suggest that hearsay 
evidence must be excluded out of abstract notions of “respect and con-
cern” for the accused. 
 Similarly, the admission of hearsay evidence does not transform an 
accused from the subject of a criminal trial into a detached object of 
the proceeding; the fact remains that the accused participates in the 
trial by his very presence, his arguments through counsel, and, where 
applicable, his confrontation of witnesses through counsel.297 There 
are differing degrees of participation involved in each of these forms, 
for each accused, and each counsel. That a reduced form of participa-
tion exists for some period of time with respect to some evidence does 
not, in and of itself, render the trial less fair or demean the accused. 
 As the above discussion indicates, it is difficult to see how the ad-
mission of hearsay evidence, which is justifiable on epistemic grounds, 
is somehow not justifiable on fairness grounds. Although in exceptional 
cases some rules of evidence are likely to lead to conflicts between the 
values of truth and fairness, the hearsay rule is not within this category 
of evidentiary rules. Hearsay should be admissible because it tends to 
allow the fact-finder to arrive at the truth (which is, in itself, a fair out-
come for either the materially guilty or the materially innocent defen-
dant), and there are no other compelling fairness-related reasons for 
ex uding hearsay evidence. cl
3. Giving Principled Content to Hearsay and Confrontation Law 
 Let us now put everything together in order to determine how 
constitutional and evidence law should treat hearsay statements on a 
principled basis. Relevant, non-redundant evidence will often come in 
the form of hearsay.298 This type of evidence carries certain inherent 
weaknesses, namely the inability of the trier of fact to discern, through 
cross-examination, any problems with the perception, memory, sincer-
ity, or communication ability of the declarant.299 If rules of evidence 
                                                                                                                      
296 Cf. sources cited supra notes 310, 312 (discussing scientific studies that concluded 
that juries are inherently skeptical of hearsay evidence). 
297 Cf. Massaro, supra note 271, at 910 (discussing the importance of the defendant’s 
participation in the trial when hearsay is admitted). But see Choo, supra note 282, at 40–41 
(noting that hearsay rules ensure the parties participation in the proceeding); Stein, supra 
note 258, at 31 (stating that the issue with hearsay evidence is a concern for the full par-
ticipation of the accused). 
298 See Laudan, supra note 255, at 137 (“Many of these evidentiary practices hinder the 
ability of the jury to come to a correct verdict because they block the jury’s access to rele-
vant, often powerfully relevant, evidence.”). 
299 See Choo, supra note 282, at 17. 
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law are understood as reinforcing both epistemic and fairness princi-
ples, however, there is no reason why hearsay should be excluded be-
cause there is no empirically valid reason for us to believe that its ad-
mission would lead fact-finders away from the truth.300 Further, the 
admission of such evidence would not be an affront to the obligations 
of fairness, dignity, and respect that are owed by society to an ac-
se
the weak-
ess
                                                                                                                     
cu d.301 Every form of evidence comes with its own unique set of 
weaknesses, but according to epistemic and fairness principles, this is 
not a sufficient reason for the evidence to be excluded from a trial. 
 Hearsay evidence should be admissible, but this is not to say that 
hearsay is free from any weaknesses, or that hearsay evidence should be 
afforded the same weight in every case as other forms of evidence. No 
evidence is perfect. Just as with other forms of evidence, however, cer-
tain precautions can be imposed so as to draw the fact-finder’s atten-
tion to the weaknesses of the evidence. In Canada, for instance, the tes-
timony of unreliable or unsavory witnesses is not excluded from a 
criminal trial; rather, in accordance with direction from the SCC in R. 
v. Vetrovec, the testimony is admissible, but the trial judge must caution 
the jury (with a Vetrovec warning) of the risks inherent in such testi-
mony.302 Similarly, American scholars and judges have long recognized 
the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness testimony, but instead of exclud-
ing eyewitness evidence altogether, which would be absurd, “[m]ost 
courts now allow some form of cautionary jury instructions on eyewit-
ness evidence, the majority of which are modeled after the instruction 
set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.”303 In both of these examples, a principled basis for the rule of 
evidence developed: Admit the relevant evidence because it will tend to 
assist the fact-finder in arriving at the truth and because there is noth-
ing unfair in admitting it, but caution the fact-finder about 
n es of the evidence because this will also tend to yield more accurate 
factual findings.304 The same principle should be applied in the context 
of hearsay, and any form of evidence with known weaknesses. 
 
300 See id. at 42–43 (stating that it is not guaranteed that admissible forms of evidence 
are any more reliable than evidence excluded under hearsay rules). 
301 But see id. at 41–42 (arguing that the rules prohibiting the admission of hearsay 
provide the accused with the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses and 
thus ensure respect for individual dignity). 
302 See [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811, 817–18. 
303 Christian Sheehan, Note, Making the Jurors the “Experts”: The Case for Eyewitness Identi-
fication Jury Instructions, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 651, 654 (2011). 
304 See Vetrovec, [1982] 1 S.C.R. at 817–18; Sheehan, supra note 303, at 654. 
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 The broad admission of hearsay statements cannot be opposed on 
dignity or participation grounds because the admission of hearsay pre-
cludes cross-examination of the declarant but it does not preclude 
cross-examination of the witness who provides the hearsay evidence at 
trial, nor does it preclude counsel for the accused from making argu-
ments about the weight that should attach to such testimony (where 
there is uncertainty about the declarant’s perception, memory, sincer-
ity, or communication skill). In other words, even though a lack of op-
portunity for cross-examination might prevent an accused from conclu-
sively and positively exposing contradictions or falsehoods in the 
sti
demonstrating the weaknesses in-
here
 ad-
mitt ith 
hear
lone that the fact-finder 
cannot evaluate it as well as she could evidence that has been 
exposed to cross-examin ttle sense—almost as lit-
ls within each 
                                                                                                                     
te mony of a witness—something that seems to happen much more 
often on television than in reality—it still permits the accused to raise 
reasonable doubt about his guilt by 
nt in hearsay evidence. 
In short, truth and fairness demand that hearsay evidence be 
ed, rather than excluded. The fallacy of doing anything else w
say evidence is plainly apparent: 
To exclude evidence on the ground a
ation makes li
tle sense as a hungry person refusing food for the reason that 
it is not as nutritious as it could be.305 
Conclusion 
 American confrontation law lacks principle because it arbitrarily 
distinguishes between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence and 
because it is a slave to history, rather than to legal principles. Canadian 
hearsay law purports to respect principles of reliability and necessity, but 
often fails to do so by admitting evidence untested by the accepted 
means of assessing reliability. Neither jurisdiction’s law respects the 
truth-seeking function of a criminal trial, nor adequately balances epis-
temic considerations with fairness concerns, in large part because both 
Canadian and American courts tend to overestimate, or unquestioningly 
accept, the value of cross-examination in producing truthful, accurate 
verdicts. I have described here how the principles of truth and fairness 
can ground a coherent body of evidence law, and can animate the con-
tent of hearsay and confrontation law in Canada and the United States, 
respectively. The truth-seeking function of criminal tria
 
305 Ho, supra note 269, at 237. 
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country may be better respected by simply admitting hearsay evidence 
accompanied by appropriate arguments by counsel regarding the 
weight that such evidence should be afforded, and with cautions to the 
trier of fact about weaknesses inherent in such testimony. 
 The law that I am proposing might, at first glance, seem to en-
compass a radical idea. It should be recalled, however, that hearsay evi-
dence has never been categorically excluded from criminal trials in civil 
law jurisdictions;306 rather, in those places where “free proof”307 is the 
governing doctrine of evidence, hearsay statements can simply form 
part of the entire evidentiary dossier upon which a court relies when 
rendering a decision. Furthermore, recently, rules excluding hearsay 
evidence are generally on the decline, even throughout the common 
law world.308 In 2003, England created an extremely broad exception to 
the hearsay exclusionary rule for first-hand hearsay of witnesses who 
are unavailable to testify at trial due to death or intimidation, among 
other reasons.309 Since the 1990s, similar sweeping changes to hearsay 
law occurred in Scotland, New Zealand, and Australia, all by statute, 
and all toward greater admissibility of hearsay evidence.310 Finally, in 
Canada, in a case in which the right of a witness to wear her religious 
veil clashed with the right of an accused to cross-examine a key witness, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that “appropriate jury instructions 
may go some considerable way to mitigate any unfairness that may flow 
om
                                                                                                                     
fr  an evidentiary or procedural rule that has limited the scope of 
cross-examination.”311 Perhaps the idea of admitting all relevant, non-
redundant hearsay, with appropriate cautions, is not such a large depar-
ture from the common law of evidence after all. 
 What is more, there already seems to be a trend developing in 
both Canada and the United States toward increased admission of evi-
dence that has not been cross-examined. In Canada, this trend can be 
 
306 See Sklansky, supra note 111, at 36 (“The bottom line is that the hearsay rule . . . re-
mains alien to civil-law legal systems.”). 
307 See Stein, supra note 274, at 117 (“For fact-finders, free evaluation of evidence en-
tails freedom from legal constraints in inferring facts from evidence. This fundamental 
freedom is surrounded, but not interfered with, by legal rules that constitute the law of 
evidence.”). 
308 See generally Marian K. Brown, Reform and Proposed Reform of Hearsay Law in Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Canada, with Special Regard to Prior Inconsistent 
Statements, Paper Presented at the 2007 Annual Conference of the International Society 
for the Reform of Criminal Law (2007), available at http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2007/ 
Brown.pdf (noting widespread reform of hearsay rules in common law jurisdictions). 
309 See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 116 (Eng.). 
310 Sklansky, supra note 111, at 28–30. 
311 R. v. S. (N.) (2010), 102 O.R. 3d 161, para. 51 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
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tates, the 
en
 our original nautical metaphor, as good sailors always do when 
telling stories, I suggest that it is time for courts to halt the “drifting” 
tendencies of their hearsay and confrontation doctrines by more hon-
estly and effectively “anchoring” these bodies of law in epistemic prin-
ciple. 
                                                                                                                     
seen in the continued emphasis by the SCC that a trial judge should 
only consider threshold reliability when deciding whether to admit 
hearsay because the trier of fact should be the one who determines ul-
timate reliability. This movement by the SCC will likely have the effect 
of rendering more and more hearsay evidence admissible at the initial 
stage of the inquiry, while leaving it to the jury (with appropriate ar-
guments by counsel and limiting instructions from the judge) to decide 
what weight the evidence should receive. In the United S
tr d apparently began in lower courts, and continued to the Supreme 
Court in Bryant. Courts are struggling to characterize out-of-court 
statements as “non-testimonial,” perhaps in order to avoid the blanket 
exclusionary rule now in force under the Sixth Amendment. 
 One cannot help but wonder whether Canadian and American 
courts already recognize that it is difficult to justify the exclusion of 
hearsay evidence on principled grounds, and whether these courts are 
now trying to avoid unprincipled outcomes by subversively admitting 
evidence on unacknowledged grounds. It would be problematic for 
courts to admit evidence when their common law or constitutional law 
doctrines tell them to exclude it—not because the results of their evi-
dentiary rulings would be unjustifiable on principled grounds, but be-
cause the decisions would be unjustified by reference to espoused prin-
ciples. It would be far better for the sake of transparency, coherence, 
and principle, if courts were to “admit”312 the problem that they are 
having with the exclusion of hearsay evidence, “confront”313 it head-on, 
and recreate their respective laws in a manner that eliminates the prob-
lem: namely, by allowing the admission of all hearsay evidence, encour-
aging counsel to provide argument about the quality of such evidence, 
and cautioning fact-finders about the dangers of such evidence. To re-
turn to
 
312 The double entendre here is intentional. 
313 Here as well. 
